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THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
OF 1958 ON BUYERS IN THE ORDINARY
COURSE OF BUSINESS
DAVID W. EVANS
THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958 (1958 Act)1 re-
quires aircraft owners and other interested parties to re-
cord their interests with the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA).' Section 503 of the 1958 Act provides that "[n]o con-
veyance or instrument the recording of which [is required by
the 1958 Act] .. .shall be valid .. .against any person ...
until such conveyance or other instrument is filed for recorda-
tion with [the FAA]."' Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC), as adopted by most state legislatures,' provides
a priority system for parties claiming interests in chattels.5
The UCC usually protects a buyer in the ordinary course of
business' from his seller's lender's interest7 ("inventory
lender").
Courts confuse the relation of section 503 of the 1958 Act to
article 9 of the UCC. Some courts hold that, in addition to the
filing requirement, the 1958 Act provides a priority system for
49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976). See infra note 45 for the text of section 1403.
See infra notes 44-75 and accompanying text.
3 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976). See infra note 45 for the text of section 1403.
4 1 P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN AND D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE vii (1967) [hereinafter cited as P. COOGAN].
' See infra notes 76-100 and accompanying text.
6 U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1977) defines a buyer in the ordinary course of business as "a
person who. . . buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods
of that kind . . . ." See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1977) provides that "[a] buyer in ordinary course of business
...takes free of a security interest created by his beller. ... See infra note 81 and
accompanying text.
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lien claimants that preempts state law.8 Many courts hold
that only the filing provisions of the 1958 Act preempt state
law, so state law governs disputes between lien claimants.
A typical fact pattern 0 involves an aircraft dealer who ar-
ranges inventory financing" with an inventory lender. When
the dealer subsequently purchases a new plane from the man-
ufacturer, the inventory lender files with the FAA both the
dealer's bill of sale and the inventory lender's lien on the new
plane. The inventory lien prohibits the dealer from selling the
plane without the inventory lender's consent. A consumer
buyer later arranges a purchase money mortgage with a bank
to buy the new plane. Neither the buyer nor the bank
searches the FAA records, but the bank files with the FAA the
buyer's title and the bank's lien on the new plane. When the
dealer defaults on its note to the inventory .lender, the lender
seeks to repossess the new plane, arguing that its lien is supe-
rior to the buyer's title and the bank's lien.
Some courts would hold that the 1958 Act totally preempts
UCC priorities, thus favoring the prior perfecting secured
party over all subsequent lienholders. 2 These courts hold for
the inventory lender over the buyer and the bank." Other
courts hold that the 1958 Act does not preempt UCC priori-
ties, thus favoring the buyer as a buyer in the ordinary course
of business."
6 See, e.g., Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971), discussed infra notes 134-52 and
accompanying text; O'Neill v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, N.A., 360 So. 2d 150
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), discussed infra notes 122-33 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp. (In re Gary Aircraft
Corp.), 681 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3110 (1983), discussed
infra notes 242-70 and accompanying text.
10 These facts are based on Texas Nat'l Bank of Houston v. Aufderheide, 235 F.
Supp. 599 (E.D. Ark. 1964), discussed infra notes 164-77 and accompanying text.
Inventory financing is called floor planning.
" See, e.g., Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971), discussed infra notes 134-52 and
accompanying text (holding that because the 1958 Act totally preempted state law
priorities, the secured party that first perfected its lien with the FAA had priority
over secured parties that filed later).
13 Id.
" See Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp. (In re Gary Aircraft Corp.),
681 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3110 (1983), discussed infra
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A conflict exists, therefore, between the UCC, which grants
priority to the buyer in the ordinary course of business, and
the 1958 Act, which some courts interpret as denying such
priority. To resolve this conflict, courts first must determine
to what extent the 1958 Act preempts state laws governing
lien priorities under the UCC.15 Courts that reconcile the con-
flict in favor of the UCC still must determine the 1958 Act's
effect on the Uniform Commercial Code.
This paper will examine the conflict between the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 and the UCC and propose a solution.
The first two sections of this paper will examine the 1958
Act's language and history and explain briefly the operation of
UCC article 9. The third and fourth sections of this paper will
explore arguments for and against the 1958 Act's preemption
of the UCC and other possible effects the Act has on the UCC
doctrine favoring the buyer in the ordinary course of business.
I. THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL RECORDATION OF
AIRCRAFT INTERESTS
The first aviation act, the Air Commerce Act of 1926,16 did
not require lienholders to record their interests in aircraft. 17
However, two subsequent pieces of legislation, the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938 s (1938 Act) and the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958,19 both required lienholders to record their title and
notes 242-70 and accompanying text.
" Recently the United States Supreme Court considered Philco Aviation Inc. v.
Shackett, 103 S. Ct. 2476 (1983), discussed infra, notes 37 and 269. The Court
granted certioari only on the question of preemption: "By enacting 49 U.S.C. § 1403
requiring recordation of conveyances affecting aircraft, did Congress preempt state
law insofar as state law would permit conveyance of title to aircraft by transfer of
possession alone, without FAA recording?" 51 U.S.L.W. 3306 (Oct. 19, 1982). The
Court did not resolve the apparent priority conflict granted secured parties under the
1958 Act and the UCC. 103 S. Ct. at 2480.
" Pub. L. No. [69-j 254, 44 Stat. [Part II] 568, 570 (1926) (repealed and reenacted
at 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976)).
"7 Section 3(f) of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 empowered the Secretary of Com-
merce to prescribe regulations to govern the registration of aircraft certificates which
were not title documents. The Act contains no provision requiring parties to record
documents evidencing title or security interests. See 44 Stat. [Part II] 570.
" Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973, 1005 (1938) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 521
(1952))(repealed and reenacted at 49 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976)).
" Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 771 (1958) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1401
1983]
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security documents affecting aircraft with the designated fed-
eral agency.2 0 Although the 1938 Act eventually was repealed,
it paved the way for many advancements in the field of secur-
ity interest recordation.
A. Recordation Under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
Congress enacted the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 to
achieve greater safety and progress in air transportation by
regulating the industry 1 and strengthening the economics of
air commerce.2 2 One problem that Congress sought to remedy
in particular was the economic difficulty of financing aircraft
purchases, caused by the mobility of aircraft through many
state jurisdictions.2 3 Before Congress enacted the 1938 Act,
buyers and lenders had to search and file lien instruments
with every conceivable recording authority in every jurisdic-
tion to adequately protect their interests.2 4 The differing filing
requirements, the number of jurisdictions in which the lender
had to file, and the uncertainty about whether such attempts
to perfect a lien were adequate complicated and hindered air-
craft financing.2 5 By enacting the 1938 Act, Congress sought
to "protect"26 lenders by providing a centralized place for
filing and eliminating the duplicitous number of filings
required.2 7
Title V of the 1938 Act required owners of aircraft to regis-
(1976)). This act repealed the 1926 legislation.
10 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976). The 1938 Act established the Civil Aeronautics Author-
ity; the 1958 Act established the Federal Aviation Administration.
21 52 Stat. 973 (1938). See S. REP. No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938) [herein-
after 1938 SENATE REPORT].
11 1938 SENATE REPORT, supra note 21, at 1. The report stated "without economic
stability there can be no safety." Id. The Senate supported the 1938 Act, in part,
because investors were dissatisfied with air commerce under the laws existing in 1938.
Id. at 2.
23 See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, To CREATE A CIVIL
AERONAUTIC AUTHORITY, H.R. Doc. No. 9738, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 406-07 (1938)






ter their aircrafts' nationality, 8 certain aircraft components, 9
and to record the ownership of their aircraft.30 The 1938 Act
further required the Civil Aeronautics Authority to systemati-
cally record "conveyances. 3 1 It defined "conveyance" to in-
clude a "bill of sale, contract of conditional sale, mortgage, as-
signment of mortgage, or other instrument affecting title to, or
interest in, property. '3 2 The statutory language implies that
the parties should file original copies 3 of documents resulting
from two-party, consensual transactions.3 ' Once a person re-
corded an instrument with the Civil Aeronautics Authority,3 5
the instrument was "valid as to all persons"3 " without any fur-
" Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, tit. V, § 501, 52 Stat. 973,
1005 (1938) (repealed and reenacted at 49 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976)).
" Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, tit. V, § 502, 52 Stat. 973,
1006 (1938) (repealed and reenacted at 49 U.S.C. § 1402 (1976)). Section 502 required
the registration of aircraft engines, propellers and appliances. Id.
30 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, tit. V, § 503, 52 Stat. 973,
1005 (1938) (repealed and reenacted at 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976)). The relevant parts
of section 503 provided:
Conveyance to be Recorded
(b) No conveyance ... which affects the title to, or interest in,
any civil aircraft of the United States, or any portion thereof,
shall be valid in respect of such aircraft or portion thereof
against any person other than the person by whom the convey-
ance is made or given, his heir or devisee, and any person hav-
ing actual notice thereof, until such conveyance is recorded in
the office of the secretary of the Authority. Every such convey-
ance so recorded in the office of the secretary of the Authority
shall be valid as to all persons without further recordation. Any
instrument, recordation of which is required by the provisions
of this section, shall take effect from the date of its recordation,
and not from the date of its execution.
Id.
" Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, tit. V, § 503(a), 52 Stat. 973,
1006 (1938) (repealed and reenacted at 49 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (1976)).
32 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, tit. I, § 1(18), 52 Stat. 973, 978
(1938).
" Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, tit. V, § 503, 52 Stat. 973,
1006 (1938) (required parties to notarize filed instruments).
$4 See supra notes 30-32.
35 Prior to recording, a recordable instrument was "valid" only with respect to the
parties to the transaction, their heirs or devisees, and persons with actual notice of
the trarsaction. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, tit. V, § 503(b), 52
Stat. 973, 1006 (1938). See supra note 30 for the text of section 503.
" Id.
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ther recording. 7 Congress did not define "valid" in the 1938
Act.38
When enacting the 1938 Act, the 75th Congress did not
thoroughly discuss the effect the federal recording should
have on the priority of claimants to interests in aircraft. The
only use of the word "priority" in the legislative history ap-
31 Id. In an early case, Anderson v. Triair Assoc., 1949 U.S. Av. Rptr. 440 (Wis. Cir.
Ct. 1947) the court determined that it was possible for parties to perfect a security
interest by filing under state laws as well as under the 1938 Act, and held that a
subsequent repairman did not have a duty to check the CAA records. Id. at 445-48.
Beginning with In re Veterans' Air Express Co., 76 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1948), dis-
cussed infra note 149, every court has held that the 1938 Act's and, later, the 1958
Act's filing requirement was the exclusive method to perfect an interest in aircraft.
See, e.g., McCormack v. Air Center, Inc., 571 P.2d 835 (Okla. 1977) (holding that a
subsequent repairman of an aircraft properly perfected his mechanic's and material-
man's lien by filing a lien notice with the FAA even though the relevant Oklahoma
statute required filing with the local county recorder, because the Oklahoma filing
requirement was procedural rather than substantive, and thus, the 1958 Act pre-
empted state filing requirements for aircraft). But see State v. Green, 158 N.J. Super.
124, 385 A.2d 896 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (holding that the FAA did not
preempt or impliedly repeal a State regulatory apparatus and that, therefore, a pri-
vate aircraft owner was liable for a $50 fine for his failure to register his aircraft with
the State).
Recently, the United States Supreme Court considered the exclusivity of the 1958
Act's fling requirement in Philco Aviation, Inc. v. Shackett, 103 S. Ct. 2476 (1983). In
Philco, buyer-1 sought a declaratory judgment that they had clear title to their new
aircraft, which they purchased from a dealer. The buyer-I relied on the dealer to
record their title in the aircraft, but the dealer never recorded the title. The dealer
also sold the same aircraft, subsequently, to a second buyer to satisfy an indebted
obligation to buyer-2. Buyer-2 recorded its bill of sale with the FAA but buyer-I had
possession of the plane. The Seventh Circuit, 681 F.2d 506, held that buyer-2 could
not qualify as a good faith purchaser because it never had possession. Further, the
court stated that buyer-2 was not a buyer in the ordinary course of business because
U.C.C. § 1-201(9) excludes from it definition of a buyer in the ordinary course of
business a purchaser who gives satisfaction of a money debt as value for the transac-
tion. The Seventh Circuit failed to explain why buyer-i's failure to file with the FAA
did not significantly affect its analysis.
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding that the recording provi-
sions of the 1958 Act preempt the Illinois law that permits transfer by possession
without recordation. 103 S. Ct. at 2480. The Court reasoned that the express language
of the statute as construed by the context and legislative history required all transfers
of aircraft to be recorded before such transfer could affect the rights of innocent third
parties. Id. at 2479-80. The Court concluded "we hold that state laws allowing un-
documented or unrecorded transfers of interests in aircraft to affect innocent third
parties are preempted by the federal Act." Id. at 2480.
3' See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, tit. I, § 1, 52 Stat. 973,
977 (1938). Congress did not indicate what the term encompassed. See 1938 HEAR-
INGS, supra note 23, at 406-07; 1938 SENATE REPORT, supra note 21, at 1-2.
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pears in a Senate amendment that withdrew from the 1938
Act the sentence, "[e]very instrument so recorded shall have
priority over all other claims arising after July 1, 1939, against
the aircraft subject thereto." 9 The ambiguous language of
section 503, as enacted,'4 0 could be interpreted to equate "va-
lidity" with priority and to give priority status to the party
that files a security instrument with the federal administra-
tion.4 1 The statute, however, does not make priority depend
upon the chronological order in which the parties filed. Under
the literal wording of the statute, when several lien claimants
each file lien instruments, each document is "valid" against
each other filed document. 42 The patent absurdity of this re-
sult emphasizes the inherent problems stemming from the
omission of a priority scheme in section 503.43
39 83 CONG. REC. 6,757 (1938). No legislative history explains the withdrawal of this
complete priority scheme. The sentence had followed the last part of section 503(c) of
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973, 1006 (1938). See supra note 30. Con-
gress intended the 1938 Act to create "protection" for lenders with interests in air-
craft. See 1938 HEARINGS, supra note 23, at 406-07 (statement by Fred D. Fagg, Jr.,
Director of Air Commerce, Department of Commerce). The "protection" merely re-
ferred to the difficulty of multiple recordings of lenders' interests due to the high
mobility of the aircraft through many states.
40 See supra note 30.
" Secured parties frequently argue this. See, e.g., Dowell v. Beech Acceptance
Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823
(1971), discussed infra notes 134-52 and accompanying text; O'Neill v. Barnett Bank
of Jacksonville, 360 So. 2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), discussed infra notes 122-33
and accompanying text.
11 See Gary Aircraft Corp. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp. (In re Gary Aircraft Corp.), 681
F.2d 365, 371 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982) (two lenders recorded conflicting interests; the court
protected the buyer in the ordinary course's lender pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-307(1)),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2476 (1983); Northern Ill. Corp. v. Bishop Distrib. Co., 284 F.
Supp. 121 (W.D. Mich. 1968) (the court protected buyer's lender rather than seller's
lender); Tex. Nat'l Bank of Houston v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Ark.
1964) (three parties recorded their interests including two conflicting security inter-
ests held by the seller's and buyer's lenders; the court protected the buyer's lender).
" In 1948, Congress was concerned about the difficulty the airline industry had in
obtaining secured financing for engines and propellers used to upgrade aircraft. Rec-
ordation of Liens on Engines and Parts; Liability for Injuries or Damages: Hearing
on S. 2454 and S. 2455 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 7, 19 (1948) (statement by G. Nathan
Calkins, Jr., General Counsel's Office, Civil Aeronautics Board and statement by
Henry G. Hotchkiss, Counsel for Aircraft Industries Assoc. of America). Section 503
of the 1938 Act did not permit recordation of interests in engines and propellers,
which resulted in creditor hesitance to loan money for such items. Congress amended
section 503 to provide for recordation of interests in specific engines and for a general
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B. Recordation Under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
Congress repealed and reenacted the 1926 and 1938 Acts
and their amendments as the 1958 Act.'4 Section 5034' of the
"basket-lien" to accomodate spare parts financing. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, tit.
V, § 503, 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976) (codification of amendment). Congress expanded
the specific parts lien in 1959 to include specifically identified propellers. Act of July
8, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-81, 73 Stat. 180 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c)
(1976)). The priority of a specific engine or propeller lien over a basket-lien is the
only clear priority established by federal filing. See infra note 45.
" Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, 806 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976)). Congress specifically indicated its intent that
the reenactment should not be interpreted as acceptance or rejection of judicial deci-
sions under the 1938 Act. H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted
in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3741, 3750 [hereinafter 1958 REPORT]; CONF.
REPT. No. 2556, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3767, 3771.
15 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 503, 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976). Section 1403 pro-
vides in relevant part:
(a) Establishment of recording system
The Secretary of Transportation shall establish and maintain a system
for the recording of each and all of the following:
(1) Any conveyance which affects the title to, or any interest in,
any civil aircraft of the United States;
(2) Any lease, and any mortgage, equipment trust, contract of
conditional sale, or other instrument executed for security pur-
poses, which lease or other instrument affects the title to, or any
interest in, any specifically identified aircraft engine or engines
of seven hundred and fifty or more rated takeoff horsepower...
or any specifically identified aircraft propeller capable of ab-
sorbing seven hundred and fifty or more rated takeoff shaft
horsepower, and also any assignment or amendment thereof or
supplement thereto;
(3) Any lease, and any mortgage, equipment trust, contract of
conditional sale, or other instrument executed for security pur-
poses, which lease or other instrument affects the title to, or any
interest in, any aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances main-
tained by or on behalf of an air carrier certificated under section
1424(b) of this title for installation or use in aircraft, aircraft
engines, or propellers, or any spare parts maintained by or on
behalf of such an air carrier, which instrument need only de-
scribe generally by types the engines, propellers, appliances, and
spare parts covered thereby and designate the location or loca-
tions thereof; and also any assignment or amendment thereof or
supplement thereto.
(b) Recording or releases, cancellations, discharges or satisfactions
The Secretary of Transportation shall also record under the system
provided for in subsection (a) of this section any release, cancellation,
discharge or satisfaction relating to any conveyance or other instru-
ment recorded under said system.
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1958 Act contains recordation provisions substantially identi-
cal to those in the 1938 Act."' Like the 1938 Act, the 1958 Act
requires parties to record "conveyances" 47 which are, upon
filing,4 s "valid as to all persons without further recordation."'"
Congress did not change the definition of "conveyance" 50 or
provide a definition of "valid" or "validity."'" By leaving the
recording provisions of the 1938 Act substantially unchanged,
Congress perpetuated the ambiguity which confused courts re-
garding the Act's effect on priority among claimants to air-
craft interests.2
(c) Validity of conveyances or other instruments; filing
No conveyance or instrument the recording of which is provided for by
subsection (a) of this section shall be valid in respect of such aircraft,
aircraft engine or engines, propellers, appliances, or spare parts against
any person other than the person by whom the conveyance or other
instrument is made or given, his heir or devisee, or any person having
actual notice thereof, until such conveyance or other instrument is
filed for recordation in the office of the Secretary of Transportation
(d) Effect of recording
Each conveyance or other instrument recorded by means of or under
the system provided for in subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall
from the time of its filing for recordation be valid as to all persons
without further or other recordation, except that an instrument re-
corded pursuant to subsection (a)(3) of this section shall be effective
only with respect to those of such items which may from time to time
be situated at the designated location or locations and only while so
situated: Provided, That an instrument recorded under subsection
(a)(2) of this section shall not be affected as to the engine or engines,
or propeller or propellers, specifically identified therein, by any instru-
ment theretofore or thereafter recorded pursuant to subsection (a)(3)
of this section.
Id.
46 1958 REPORT, supra note 44, at 3755. The provisions are not identical, but all the
significant language is the same. Compare note 30, supra, with note 45, supra.
47 49 U.S.C. § 1403(a)(1) (1976).
48 49 U.S.C. § 1403(d) (1976). This section changed the time of effectiveness pro-
vided by the 1938 Act. See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706,
§ 503(b), 52 Stat. 973, 1006 (repealed and reenacted at 49 U.S.C. § 1403(b)
(1976))(providing that "[a]ny instrument .. . shall take effect from the date of its
recordation").
" 49 U.S.C. § 1403(d) (1976).
50 See 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976).
51 Id.
52 Se- supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. Filing with the FAA is accom-
plished by mailing a completed bill of sale on a form provided by the FAA along with
the requisite fee to the FAA recording office in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. See
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In 1964, Congress amended the 1958 Act to clarify adminis-
trative and judicial interpretation of section 503.5' The legisla-
ture recognized that borrowers, lenders and courts were con-
fused about what law applied to determine whether a
recorded instrumeht was "valid." 5' Accordingly, Congress
added section 506 1 to the 1958 Act to designate the law of the
place where the security agreement was delivered as control-
ling.56 The Senate stated:
When the instrument has been filed for recordation under the
law, all persons are deemed to have notice of its existence and
its effect on title to the property covered thereby. Conse-
quently, to determine whether there are any encumbrances on
the aircraft, it is only necessary to consult the central file.57
Without question the amendment federally preempted local
filing requirements and procedures."8 The legislative history
indicates that Congress, as a whole, likewise intended a buyer
to have constructive notice of the contents of filed
instruments.59
Section 506, by its terms, does not designate the controlling
Robinson, The FAA Aircraft Registry and Its Operation, 39 INs. COUNS. J. 238 (1972)
(detailing internal procedures at the FAA); ROLLO, AVIATION LAW 139 (1979) (briefly
describing how to file titles and liens with the FAA).
83 Act of June 30, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-346, 78 Stat. 236 (1964)(codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 503, 506 (1976)).
5, S. REP. No. 1060, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2319-20 [hereinafter 1964 REPORT].
55 49 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976). Section 1406 provides:
The validity of any instrument the recording of which is provided for
by sectibn 1403 of this title shall be governed by the laws of the State,
District of Columbia, or territory of possession of the United States in
which such instrument is delivered, irrespective of the location or the
place of delivery of the property which is the subject of such instru-
ment. Where the place of intended delivery of such instrument is spec-
ified therein, it shall constitute presumptive evidence that such instru-
ment was delivered at the place so specified.
Id.
H The statutory language appears to refer to the enforceability of the security
agreement among parties to the agreement. The Senate Commerce Committee re-
ported that the amendment was designed to clarify which jurisdiction's laws must be
followed to create an enforceable contract. 1964 REPORT, supra note 54, at 2320.
57 Id. at 2323.
" See supra note 37.
'9 See supra text at note 57.
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law in many situations. The statute requires courts to resolve
choice-of-law questions in situations such as conflicts between
two parties with interests in the same aircraft, whose con-
tracts were delivered in different states, and who seek judicial
relief in a third state.60 The statutory language and legislative
history make no mention of the law which should control sub-
sequent lawsuits involving litigants who were not original par-
ties to the filed agreement. 1
In addition to adding section 506,62 Congress amended sec-
tion 503(e)6 3 to permit the FAA to exempt certain lien instru-
ments from the notarization requirement." At the same time,
the Senate stated in its report that it intended to permit in-
terested parties to file non-consensual lien instruments such
as judicial decrees.6 5 This amendment, in effect, broadened
the language of section 503, which was limited to two-party
consensual transactions.6
Today, section 503 of the 1958 Act provides for the filing
and recordation of interests in aircraft67 and interests in spe-
cific aircraft parts.66 The statute permits parties to file liens
on spare parts in inventory without designating those parts
specifically,69 and clearly covers consensual transactions. 0
:0 See infra notes 278-84 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 55.
: 49 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976).
' Act of June 30, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-346, 78 Stat. 236 (1964) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1403(e) (1976)). See supra note 45 for text of section 1403.
4 Id.
" 1964 REPORT, supra note 54, at 2321.
" See supra notes 34 and 47 and accompanying text. The accompanying regula-
tion, 14 C.F.R. § 49.31 (1982), incorporated the expanded view by permitting non-
consensual liens to be filed. The regulation provides:
This subpart applies to the recording of the following kinds of
conveyances:
(a) A bill of sale, contract of conditional sale, assignment of an
interest under a contract of conditional sale, mortgage, assign-
ment of mortgage, lease, equipment trust, notice of tax lien or of
other lien, or other instrument affecting title to, or any interest
in, aircraft.
14 C.F.R. § 49.31 (1982).
49 U.S.C. § 1403(a)(1) (1976).
49 U.S.C. § 1403(a)(2) (1976).
:9 49 U.S.C. § 1403(a)(3) (1976). This is called a basket-lien. See supra note 42.
70 See supra notes 33-34 and 46-50 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the 1964 amendment 7' expands the recording pro-
visions to include non-consensual liens.7 2 Parties who file their
lien instruments with the FAA actually or constructively no-
tify the world of the lien's existence and its effect on the title
to an aircraft or parts.73 The law of the state where the secur-
ity agreement was delivered controls the determination of the
agreement's "validity; ' 74 however, Congress has not clarified
the issue of priority among claimants to interests in aircraft.75
II. THE OPERATION OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, ARTICLE 9
A general overview of a few UCC provisions regarding se-
cured transactions is necessary because the UCC provides a
uniform basis for state laws governing commercial transac-
tions.7 ' Article 9 of the UCC establishes a system of priorities
among lien claimants, applicable to most personal property
transactions.77 Except for those instances where the 1958 Act
totally preempts UCC provisions, the UCC will control the
priorities among lien claimants in aircraft.78
A typical conflict occurs between a consumer buyer, who
pays full purchase price, and the seller's inventory lender,
who retains a secured interest in the goods sold.7 Under the
UCC, priority conflicts between a buyer in the ordinary course
of business8" and a dealer are resolved in favor of the
T' Act of June 30, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-346, 78 Stat. 236 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. §§ 1403(e), 1406 (1976)).
71 See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
73 1964 REPORT, supra note 54, at 2320.
"' 49 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976). See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. Congress
omitted a provision to determine complex conflicts of laws questions.
7' See supra notes 37-43, 50-52 and accompanying text.
7 See 1 P. COOGAN, supra note 4.
" See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
78 See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
79 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
SO U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1977). The UCC definition is in part:
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in good
faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the
ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods buys
in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of
that kind but does not include a pawnbroker .... Buying" may be
for cash or by exchange of other property or on secured or unsecured
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buyer."' A buyer in the ordinary course of business may know
that a security interest in the purchased goods exists and still
take good title free of the security interest.82 If the buyer
knows, however, that the sale to him violates the seller's se-
curity interest, the buyer is not in the "ordinary course of
business," and does not take the goods free of the security
interest.8 3 A sale to a buyer in the ordinary course of business
effectively terminates a lien on goods held by a lender who
finances a dealer's inventory. 4
credit and includes receiving goods or documents of title under a pre-
existing contract for sale but does not include a transfer.., as security
for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.
Id.
8- U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1977). This subsection provides that "[a] buyer in ordinary
course of business (subsection (9) of Section 1-201) .. .takes free of a security inter-
est created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected and even
though the buyer knows of its existence." Id.
82 Id. Comment 2 states:
Reading the two provisions together, it results that the buyer takes
free if he merely knows that there is a security interest which covers
the goods but takes subject if he knows in addition, that the sale is in
violation of some term in the security agreement not waived by the
words or conduct of the secured party.
Id., comment 2.
83 U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1977). See supra note 80. The "good faith" required of a
buyer in the ordinary course of business does not clearly add anything to the defini-
tion. The "good faith" requirement does not conflict with § 9-307(1), which permits
the buyer to know that a security interest is held on the good purchased. Only when
the buyer knows that the sale violates a third party's security interest does the UCC
require that he take the good subject to that interest. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1069-70 (2d. ed. 1980) [hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS].
84 U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1977) provides:
Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest con-
tinues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition
thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party in
the security agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any identifi-
able proceeds including collections received by the debtor.
Id. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) "otherwise provides" that a buyer in the ordinary course takes
free of a security interest created by his seller. See supra note 81 and accompanying
text. Some courts rely on a consent theory pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-306(2), deeming the
lender to actually or impliedly consent to the dealer's sale to a buyer in the ordinary
course of business. See infra notes 292-300 and accompanying text. White and Sum-
mers stated that U.C.C. § 9-306(2) covers the usual case of inventory floor plans when
the agreement contains a consent clause. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 83, at 1066.
The UCC may similarly protect a buyer other than a buyer in the ordinary course
of business from a third-party security interest. U.C.C. § 9-307(2) (1977) provides:
In the case of consumer goods, a buyer takes free of a security interest
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Since its development in England, the law governing perfec-
tion of secured transactions has required a party to file its se-
curity instrument or notice of its interest with a designated
government office.85 Prior to the UCC's enactment, most legis-
lation required "transaction filing" whereby the secured party
filed a security instrument containing an exact description of
the secured property. 6 The UCC drafters later provided for
"notice filing" 87 whereby the secured party would file a financ-
ing statment that described the types of collateral, but not
specific items.88
"Notice filing" eases the oppressive burden that was placed
on inventory financers by "transaction filing" statutes which
required the filing of separate security instruments for each
newly acquired piece of inventory8' and which hampered in-
even though perfected if he buys without knowledge of the security
interest, for value, and for his own personal, family or household pur-
poses, unless prior to the purchase the secured party has filed a financ-
ing statement covering such goods.
Id. Such a buyer typically is a consumer purchasing a good from another consumer.
The UCC, however, protects a third-party's security interest given by a non-dealer if
the buyer knew of its existence or the secured party filed its interest properly. There-
fore, a buyer from a non-dealer seller will take the good subject to the security inter-
est whether or not the buyer knows of its existence if it is recorded.
85 1 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 15.1, at 462-63 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as GILMORE].
GILMORE, supra note 85, § 15.2, at 466-67.
97 See U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(providing that "[a] financing statement must be filed to
perfect all security interests"); id. § 9-401 (specifying the place for filing); id. § 9-
402(1) (stating the requirements of a valid financing statement). Section 9-402(1) pro-
vides as follows:
A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names of the debtor
and the secured party, is signed by the debtor, gives an address of the
secured party from which information concerning the security interest
may be obtained, gives a mailing address of the debtor and contains a
statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral.
Id.
8 GILMORE, supra note 85, § 15.3, at 471.
8. Id. § 15.2, at 467-68. The author states:
Such constant filing would have been both onerous and expensive, to
say nothing of the disastrous effect it would have had on the files
themselves: if a searcher had to hunt through hundreds, if not
thousands, of contracts in order to determine which items of existing
inventory were subject to a security interest, the files might just as
well not exist at all.
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ventory financing. A UCC financing statement need only
give notice that a prior, perfected interest exists.9 It does not
provide information regarding the specifics of the prior inter-
est.2 Because the financing statement contains the creditor's
address, interested persons can question the creditor or
debtor regarding the creditor's interest in the collateral. 2
"Notice filing" under the UCC, therefore, provides only gen-
eral, public notice that an interest in unspecified goods be-
longing to the debtor possibly exists.
The UCC provides limited uniformity to the law governing
liens which result from services rendered by repairmen subse-
quent to the perfection of the secured party's interest. The
UCC protects the subsequent repairman's interest by granting
his lien priority over a prior security interest.94 Individual
states may override the UCC's provision, however, by enacting
mechanics's and materialrran's lien statutes which deny ser-
vicemen priority."
The UCC defers to federal law when the latter regulates se-
0Id.
" Id. § 15.2, at 469.
Gilmore's analysis of the notice given by "notice filing" is as follows:
The chief weakness [with "notice filing"] is that the filed notice gives
no information about the actual state of affairs. The only conclusion
which can be drawn from the notice is that the parties (whose ad-
dresses are given) evidently intended, at the time of filing, to engage in
some kind of financing transaction. No transactions may ever have
taken place; or all the loans may have been repaid so that nothing is
left outstanding; or all the debtor's assets of the types covered by the
notice may in fact be subject to lien to secure a continuing
indebtedness.
Id.
11 The creditor, however, has no duty to reveal anything about his possible security
interest, except to the debtor. U.C.C. § 9-208 (1977); GILMORE, supra note 85, § 15.3,
at 472.
U.C.C. § 9-310 (1977). The subsection provides:
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services
or materials with respect to goods subject to a security interest, a lien
upon goods in the possession of such person given by statute or rule of
law for such materials or services takes priority over a perfected secur-
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cured transactions in aircraft.6 The UCC also recognizes that
federal acts containing filing provisions preempt the UCC's
filing provisions.97 When such a federal statute applies, com-
plying with that statute is the only method of perfecting a se-
curity interest.9
Although the drafters of the UCC recognized that the 1958
Act's filing provisions, section 503, 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976),
preempted the UCC filing provisions," they stated that the
1958 Act did not contain a complete priority scheme which
would preempt the UCC. 00 Therefore, to the extent that the
- U.C.C. § 9-104 (1977). The section provides in relevant part: "This Article does
not apply (a) to a security interest subject to any statute of the United States, to the
extent that such statute governs the rights of parties to and third parties affected by
transactions in particular types of property .... ." Id.
97 U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(a) (1977). This section provides:
(3) The filing of a financing statement otherwise required by this Arti-
cle is not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in prop-
erty subject to
(a) a statute or treaty of the United States which provides for a na-
tional or international registration or a national or international certif-
icate of title or which specifies a place of filing different from that
specified in this Article for filing of the security interest; ....
d.
U.C.C. § 9-302(4) (1977) This section provides:
(4) compliance with a statute or treaty described in subsection (3)
[supra note 97] is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement
under this Article, and a security interest in property subject to the
statute or treaty can be perfected only by compliance therewith except
as provided in Section 9-103 on multiple state transactions.
Id.
U.C.C. § 9-302 comment 8 (1977). The drafters stated, in relevant part:
8. Subsection (3) [supra note 97] exempts from the filing provisions of
this Article transactions as to which an adequate system of filing, state
or federal, has been set up outside this Article and subsection (4)
makes clear that when such a system exists perfection of a relevant
security interest can be had only through compliance with that system
(i.e., filing under this Article is not a permissible alternative).
Examples of the type of federal statute referred to in paragraph
(3)(a) [supra note 97] are provisions of 17 U.S.C. §§ 28, 30 (copy-
rights), 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (aircraft), 49 U.S.C. § 20(c) (railroads).
Id.
'0 U.C.C. § 9-104 comment 1 (1977). The U.C.C. drafters commented:
1. Where a federal statute regulates the incidents of security interests
in particular types of property, those security interests are of course
governed by the federal statute and excluded from this Article. The
Ship Mortgage Act, 1920, is an example of such a federal act. The pre-
sent provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1403 et
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1958 Act provides a filing scheme, the UCC defers to the fed-
eral statute. The UCC drafters intended, however, for the
UCC provisions, rather than the 1958 Act, to govern priority
disputes among claimants to interests in aircraft.
III. THE EFFECT OF THE 1958 ACT'S FILING
PROVISIONS ON THE UCC PRIORITY SYSTEM
Every court in which claimants with conflicting liens in air-
craft seek relief 1 ' must determine the 1958 Act's impact on
the UCC's priority system.10 2 The UCC drafters recognized
seq.) call for registration of title to and liens upon aircraft with the
Civil Aeronautics Administrator [sic] and such registration is recog-
nized as equivalent to filing under this Article (Section 9-302(3)); but
to the extent that the Federal Aviation Act does not regulate the
rights of parties to and third parties affected by such transactions, se-
curity interests in aircraft remain subject to this Article.
Although the Federal Copyright Act contains provisions permitting
the mortgage of a copyright and for the recording of an assignment of
a copyright (17 U.S.C. § § 28, 30) such a statute would not seem to
contain sufficient provisions regulating the rights of the parties and
third parties to exclude security interests in copyrights from the provi-
sions of this Article . . . . Compare also with respect to patents, 35
U.S.C. § 47. The filing provisions under these Acts, like the filing pro-
visions of the Federal Aviation Act, are recognized as the equivalent to
filing under this Article. Section 9-302(3) and (4).
... The exclusionary language in paragraph (a) [supra note 96] is that
this Article does not apply to such security interest "to the extent"
that the federal statute governs the rights of the parties. Thus if the
federal statute contained no relevant provision, this Article could be
looked to for an answer.
Id. See infra notes 260-67 and accompanying text (comparing the provisions of the
FAA, Ship Mortgage Act and Federal Copyright Act).
The 1958 Act, by its terms, applies to all aircraft owned by citizens of the
United States. See 49 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(1) (1976) (registration of aircraft); id. §
1403(a)(3) (liens on aircraft). The first case to consider the issue, Aviation Credit
Corp. v. Gardner, 174 Misc. 798, 22 N.Y.S. 2d 37 (Sup. Ct. 1940), held that the stat-
ute was unconstitutional in its application to aircraft used solely in intrastate activ-
ity. The federal district court in In re Veterans' Air Express Co., 76 F. Supp. 684
(D.N.J. 1948) overruled Gardner by analogy to Congress' power to regulate navigable
waterways. The few subsequent cases to consider the issue follow Veterans' Air Ex-
press. See, e.g., Blalock v. Brown, 78 Ga. App. 537, 51 S.E.2d 610 (1949). See Scott,
Liens in Aircraft: Priorities, 25 J. AIR L. & COM. 193, 201-02 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as Scott]; Sigman, The Wild Blue Yonder: Interests in Aircraft Under Our Federal
System, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 316, 364 n.208 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Sigman].
102 See, e.g., Gary Aircraft Corp. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp. (In re Gary Aircraft
Corp.), 681 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 3110 (1983), discussed
infra notes 242-70 and accompanying text; Note, Sales-Federal Registration of Air-
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that the 1958 Act requires lienholders to file with the FAA to
perfect their liens.103 Courts must now determine whether the
1958 Act also preempts the UCC's priority system or impacts
the UCC in other ways.
A. The Extent to which the 1958 Act Preempts the UCC
1. The Argument for Total Preemption.
a. Judical Interpretation of the 1958 Act.
Several recent cases have held that the 1958 Act preempts
the entire area of recording and governs priorites among lien
claimants in aircraft.104 In 1981, the bankruptcy court in Sun
Bank, N.A. v. Snell (In re Cone)l1° broadly stated that Con-
gress preempted the field of filing and recording title instru-
ments and state priority laws.106 In Snell, the lender had
loaned the bankrupt money and received a lien on his aircraft
which the lender timely filed with the FAA.10 A creditor ob-
tained a judgement against the bankrupt in another state and
docketed its writ of execution in the bankrupt's state with the
federal marshal, who levied upon and seized the aircraft.108
The creditor argued that its lien was perfected when the it
docketed its writ of execution with the U.S. Marshal and that
it was superior to the lender's lien. 0 9 The court determined
craft-A Buyer in the Ordinary Course of Business has Constructive Notice of All
Prior Federally Recorded Interests, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 122, 132 n.71 (1974) (at-
tempting to list completely all cases that addressed the interaction of the 1958 Act
and the UCC) [hereinafter Note]. But see Pope v. Nat'l Aero Fin. Co., 236 Cal. App.
2d 722, 46 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1965) (stating that the 1958 Act preempted California pri-
ority law), discussed infra note 148.
103 U.C.C. § 9-302(4) comment 8 (1977), quoted supra note 99.
304 Sun Bank, N.A. v. Snell (In re Cone), 11 Bankr. 925 (M.D. Fla. 1981), discussed
infra notes 105-21 and accompanying text; O'Neill v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville,
N.A., 360 So. 2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), discussed infra, notes 122-32 and
accompanying text; Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971), discussed infra notes 134-52
and accompanying text.
105 11 Bankr. 925 (M.D. Fla. 1981).
:06 Id. at 927.
07 Id. at 926. The lender perfected its lien by filing according to the FAA require-
ments. Id.
108 Id.
'" Id. at 927.
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that under Florida law, a writ of execution on personal prop-
erty i3 effective when it is docketed with the U.S. Marshal. 110
The court held, however, that the 1958 Act preempted state-
prescribed methods of perfecting liens in aircraft"' and re-
quired actual seizure of the aircraft combined with either
docketing one's writ of execution or filing the writ of execu-
tion with the FAA pursuant to section 503 of the 1958 Act.'
It concluded that the lender had perfected its lien by the
proper method prior to the creditor," 3 and that the lender
held an interest superior to the creditor." 4
The Snell opinion has been interpreted as supporting total
preemption of state law by the 1958 Act." 5 The court's initial
statement in Snell, however, that the 1958 Act preempted
state priority systems does not appear necessary to the court's
reasoning or its holding. First, to support its statement that
the 1958 Act preempts state priorities, the court in Snell cited
Danning v. Pacific Propeller, Inc. (In re Holiday Airlines
Corp.)." ' The court in Pacific Propeller thoughtfully analyzed
controlling state law" 7 and refused to hold that the 1958 Act




M' The court carefully noted the chronology of events. The three crucial dates are:
(1) On August 12, 1980 a writ of execution in favor of the judgment creditor was
issued from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida and
was docketed with the United States Marshal for the district; (2) on September 24,
1980 the purchase money lender recorded with the FAA its security interest in the
aircraft, purchased by the bankrupt on September 17, 1980; (3) on November 26,
1980 the United States Marshal levied upon and seized the aircraft pursuant to the
writ of execution. Id. at 926.
"1 Id. at 930.
"5 See, e.g., Gary Aircraft Corp. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp. (In re Gary Aircraft
Corp.), 681 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 3110 (1983), discussed
infra notes 242-70 and accompanying text.
--6 620 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1980).
11 Id. at 733-35. See infra notes 278-84 and accompanying text.
1"8 The Court in Pacific Propeller initially made the broad statement that "[tihe
provisions of the Federal Aviation Act preempt state law insofar as they relate to the
priority of liens." 620 F.2d at 733. It may be that the court in Sun Bank merely began
its opinion in a similar fashion meaning to say no more than Pacific Propeller. The
interpretation of Sun Bank by the Fifth Circuit in Gary Aircraft Corp., 681 F.2d 365
(5th Cir. 1982), as holding that the 1958 Act totally preempts state priority law, does
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creditor in Snell argued that local law, rather than the 1958
Act, controlled the priority issue.'1 9 Finally, the court in Snell
merely held that the 1958 Act determined the appropriate
method to perfect a security interest which determined which
party first perfected its interest. 20 The court looked to the
1958 Act's filing provisions, rather than its preemption of
state priority law, in protecting the lender's lien. The court in
Snell, therefore, specifically held that the 1958 Act preempts
the UCC's filing provisions which necessarily include the
.proper method for perfecting liens on aircraft.121
A Florida appellate court considered the extent to which
the 1958 Act preempted Florida's version of the UCC in
O'Neill v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, N.A. 22 The buyer in
O'Neill purchased an aircraft from a fixed base operator
(FBO) 2 3 knowing that it had been used for rental purposes
and was not part of the FBO's sales inventory.' 24 The FBO's
lender did not finance the aircraft as part of the inventory
financing arrangement. 25 The lender successfully argued that
the buyer knew that the aircraft sold to him was not part of
the ordinary course of the seller's business and, further, that
this knowledge deprived the buyer of the protection afforded
a buyer in the ordinary course of business. 2  Nevertheless,
not appear to carefully read the Sun Bank opinion. Such cursory treatment of an-
other court's opinion is the error of which the Fifth Circuit suggests the bankruptcy
court in Sun Bank is guilty. See 681 F.2d at 369 n.3.
"' The lender argued that Florida's version of U.C.C. § 9-312 determined that its
purchase money security interest attached simultaneously with the debtor's purchase
of the aircraft. The court disagreed, holding instead that the FAA does not contain
such a provision permitting relation back before recording. 11 Bankr. at 927. The
judgment creditor argued that it had perfected its judgment lien when the writ of
execution was docketed with the United States Marshal. Id.
12' See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text. The court noted that Florida
law would produce a different result if a car were involved, but this difference de-
pended on what method of perfecting a lien was valid. 11 Bankr. 928.
"' The majority of cases mentioning the issue articulate this well-settled proposi-
tion. See supra note 39.
121 360 So. 2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
123 A fixed base operator, "FBO" in common parlance, supplies ground services in-
cluding rental aircraft, flight instruction, maintenance and fuel. An FBO is not pri-
marily in the business of sales of aircraft.
:2, 360 So. 2d at 152.
122 Id.
I2 d. The court stated that "[a] sale incidental to the principal business does not
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the court held that the 1958 Act preempted the section of
Florida's commercial code equivalent to UCC section 9-
307(1) 117 making the buyer in the ordinary course of business
doctrine inapplicable to aircraft purchasers.12 8
Despite the court's broad statement that the 1958 Act gov-
erns priority conflicts among lien claimants, the court did not
explain how the 1958 Act protects a prior secured party
against a subsequent purchaser who does not buy in the ordi-
nary course of business. Instead the court stated that it
adopted 129 the reasoning of Dowell v. Beech Acceptance
Corp.,18° a case which held that the 1958 Act totally pre-
empted state priority laws established by the UCC. The
O'Neill court summarily held for the lender,131 although it is
not clear how the court's adoption of Dowell led to that result.
Dowell involved a buyer in the ordinary course of business,
whereas the court in O'Neill specifically held the buyer was
not a buyer in the ordinary course of business.132 Since the
court noted that UCC section 9-307(2)133 would favor the
lender just as would the 1958 Act, the 1958 Act's preemption
of state commercial law does not change the result. The court
in O'Neill must have interpreted Dowell to hold that any lien
recorded with the FAA defeats subsequent lien claimants of
all types.
The facts of Dowell's" are typical of the transactions under-
lying the sale of new aircraft.39 The manufacturer sold an air-
caft to a regional distributor who sold it to a dealer via a con-
make the seller a person in the business of selling goods of that kind." Id. U.C.C. 9-
307(1) is adopted in Florida as FLA. STAT. § 679.307(1) (1975).
117 FLA. STAT. § 679.307(1) (1975). See supra note 84.
118 360 So. 2d at 152.
I Id.
's 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823
(1921), discussed infra notes 134-52 and accompanying text.
131 360 So. 2d at 153.
182 See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
'33 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
134 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr 1 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823
(1971).
135 See, e.g., Tex. Nat'l Bank of Houston v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599 (E.D.
Ark. 1964), discussed infra notes 164-77 and accompanying text.
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ditional sales contract.' The regional distributor sold its
security interest, which it held pursuant to the conditional
sales contract, to the manufacturer's finance company. 3 Al-
though the conditional sales contract prohibited the dealer
from selling the aircraft without the consent of the manufac-
turer's finance company, the dealer sold the plane to a con-
sumer purchaser without consent.' Two months after the
sale, the dealer informed the regional distributor of the sale,
after which the regional distributor removed the plane from
the buyer's possession without the buyer's knowledge or con-
sent. 39 The court observed that the buyer knew he could
check the FAA's registry in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for a
small fee of $3.50," and reasoned that had he done so he
would have discovered the finance company's interest, filed
eight months before the sale, and the prohibition against the
sale to the buyer. 41
The buyer can discover this information from the FAA
records, because section 503 of the 1958 Act is a "transaction
filing" statute requiring that the title instrument be filed.' 2
The court reasoned that after a title search the buyer would
not have been a buyer in the ordinary course of business
under UCC section 9-307(1) because he would have known the
sale to him was in violation of a third party's security inter-
est. 43 The buyer said he did not check the FAA registry be-
cause the plane was new, and he knew the seller was an au-
thorized dealer. '4 Furthermore, the buyer did not record his
bill of sale with the FAA, but "apparently" relied on the
dealer's promise to file it for him." 5
The court held that the 1958 Act preempts California's
's 3 Cal. 3d at 546, 476 P.2d at 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 1-2.
"s Id. at 546, 476 P.2d at 401-02, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 547, 476 P.2d at 402, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
140 Id.
Id. at 551, 476 P.2d at 405, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
"' See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text; infra notes 301-34 and accompa-
nying text.
See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
14 3 Cal. 3d at 546, 476 P.2d at 402, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
145 Id.
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commercial code and does not protect a buyer in the ordinary
course of business.1" The court reasoned that the 1958 Act
created a "federal policy" requiring recordation to protect
previously acquired aircraft titles.14 7 The tribunal understood
the Act to be a complete and comprehensive system for re-
cording interests in aircraft,148 and further reasoned that pur-
chasers had the duty1 49 to inquire at the FAA registry con-
146 Id. at 549, 550-51, 476 P.2d at 404, 405, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 4, 5.
"" Id. at 549, 476 P.2d at 404, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 4. The court used the word "pro-
tect," which it may have borrowed from the original legislative history to section 503
of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. 1938 HEARING, supra note 23, at 406, discussed
supra note 39. The court in Dowell, however, did not cite any legislative history that
supported its statement. Indeed, the "protection" the Dowell court interpreted the
1958 Act to grant to recorded interests was complete priority over subsequent [or
subsequently recorded] interests. The "protection" mentioned in the 1938 HEARING
involved a centralized recording system that simplified the way lenders had to perfect
their liens. See supra note 39; Comment, Taking the Lender for a Ride: Section 1403
of the Federal Aviation Act and the Buyer in Ordinary Course of Business, 36 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 205, 221 n.144 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
1" 3 Cal. 3d at 550, 476 P.2d at 404, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 4. For this proposition, the
court relied on two previous California cases: Pope v. Nat'l Aero Fin. Co., 236 Cal.
App. 2d 722, 46 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1965), and International Atlas Servs., Inc. v. Twenti-
eth Century Aircraft Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d 434, 59 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1967). The court in
Pope held that plaintiffs merely had acquired an interest in a flying club and did not
have specific interest in the aircraft in issue. The court also stated that the 1958 Act
preempted the field of recording conveyances of aircraft which made it incumbent on
plaintiffs to record their alleged interest, otherwise, the court reasoned, the plaintiffs
would not be entitled to any priority. 46 Cal. Rptr. at 241. In International Atlas, a
subsequent repairman had repaired the disputed aircraft under an agreement
whereby he leased three aircraft engines and a quick engine change unit (QEC) to the
owner, but failed to record these lease agreements pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1403. The
secured party had recorded its security agreement before repairs commenced. The
secured party foreclosed and repossessed the aircraft when the owner defaulted and
the subsequent repairman sued for its installed equipment. The court acknowledged
that under state law the subsequent repairman would prevail. The court held, how-
ever, that the 1958 Act preempted the field by virtue of its completeness. A lease was
recordable under 49 U.S.C. § 1403 so the subsequent repairman's failure to record
before repossession subjected its interest to that held by the secured party. Neither
the Pope nor the International Atlas opinions refer to any legislative history of the
1938 Act or the 1958 Act. Both opinions read 49 U.S.C. § 1403 at face value as estab-
lishing priority in favor of interests first recorded in accordance with the section.
M The court cited In re Veterans' Air Express Co., 76 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1948),
for this proposition. In Veterans' Air Express a subsequent repairman sought com-
pensation for performance of extensive repairs and refitting of an aircraft owned by a
bankrupt but mortgaged to the United States Government. The subsequent repair-
man, pursuant to California statute, held a possessory lien for its repair bill while the
United States sought priority of its prior recorded mortgage pursuant to section 503
of the 1938 Act. The court held that Congress preempted the entire field of activity
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cerning title to their prospective purchases.' Absent a duty
to inquire, buyers would "cavalierly" ignore the FAA registry
to retain their status as buyers in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, thus taking their aircraft free of perfected security inter-
ests.'5' Refusal by buyers to search the FAA registry, the
court noted, would "eviscerate" the federal policy that re-
quires a party to record its interest in an aircraft because
federal filing would not afford a secured party protection from
subsequent purchasers. 5 '
b. Comment.
The opinion in Dowell contains perceptive observations but
does not have support for its conclusion. Legislative history
provides little credence for the court's proposition that Con-
gress intended to protect prior recorded instruments by grant-
by enacting the 1938 Act. Id. at 686. The court further stated that all persons have
constructive notice of liens duly recorded and are charged with a duty to check the
federal registry. The important language of the court is:
It is clear that the Congress has prescribed the only way in which air-
craft may be transferred and in which liens upon aircraft may be duly
recorded. In this manner, all persons dealing with aircraft are upon
full legal notice concerning possible liens and are charged with the
duty of inquiry at the central recording office of the Civil Aeronautic
Administration with respect to any aircraft in which they might be
concerned.
Id. at 688. The opinion, which was the first to hold the 1938 Act was constitutional in
its application to intrastate aircraft, see supra note 101, was primarily decided on the
sovereignty of the United States over any claim established under state law, and not
decided on a priority system in 49 U.S.C. § 523 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §
1403 (1976)). See Scott, supra note 101, at 203; Sigman, supra note 101, at 364-65;
Note, Federal Recordation of Title to Intrastate Aircraft, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 1248
(1949). Cf. United States v. United Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1948)
(holding that the 1958 Act preempted the field of conveyancing interests in aircraft,
but a mortgage on an aircraft that did not describe specifically the two engines was
insufficient notice to third parties of the secured party's interest in the engines and,
therefore, void against a subsequent repairman of the engines).
150 3 Cal. 3d at 551, 476 P.2d at 405, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
"' Id. at 550-51, 476 P.2d at 405, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5. The court stated:
If prior recorded interests are not protected against subsequent buyers
who fail to search title, the federal policy in favor of the recordation of
aircraft titles will be frustrated and subsequent purchasers in Califor-
nia will cavalierly decline to investigate title so as to avoid "actual no-
tice" under Commercial Code Section 9307.
Id. Section 9307 is equivalent to U.C.C. 9-307. See supra note 81.
I'l 3 Cal. 3d at 552, 476 P.2d at 406, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
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ing them priority over subsequently acquired interests.' The
California Supreme Court accurately perceived, however, that
U.C.C. section 9-307(1)1" would permit subsequent purchas-
ers and lenders' " to "cavalierly" refuse to check the FAA reg-
istry and discover the status of title to aircraft sold by deal-
ers.156 The court simply needed a stronger premise than the
federal policy it attributed to the 1958 Act to support the re-
sult in Dowell.157
The opinions in O'Neill and Dowell, which hold that the
1958 Act totally preempts'state law priority schemes con-
tained in the UCC, may contain fatally defective reasoning.
The court in neither case examined the legislative history of
the 1938 Act or the 1958 Act to determine whether Congress
intended to preempt the field of priority among lien claim-
ants. Because Congressional intent is necessary for a federal
statute to preempt a conflicting state statute, " the reasoning
in O'Neill and Dowell may not be a sound basis from which to
infer that the 1958 Act totally preempts the UCC priority
scheme.
Despite the possible flaw in the Dowell reasoning, the court
accurately appraised the impact of state law on the 1958 Act's
filing requirement for buyers in the ordinary course of busi-
183 See supra notes 39 and 147.
' See supra note 84.
Compare Tex. Nat'l Bank of Houston v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599 (E.D.
Ark. 1964) (neither the buyer or his lender checked the FAA registry); Northern Ill.
Corp. v. Bishop Distrib. Co., 284 F. Supp. 121 (W.D. Mich. 1968) (neither the bank or
the borrower who purchased the aircraft checked the FAA registry) with United
States Aviation Underwriters Inc. v. WTAE Flying Club, 300 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa.
1969) (a lender of a buyer not in the ordinary course of business searched the FAA
records and paid the proceeds of the loan to an inventory lender).
'" The court stated forcefully that "[tihe federal policy to foster recordation and
to protect recorded interests is eviscerated by a rule which relies on state laws to
protect the buyer in the ordinary course of business even though he fails to undertake
a simple title search which would have readily revealed all encumbrances." 3 Cal. 3d
at 552, 476 P.2d at 406, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
167 For other possible bases to prevent the operation of U.C.C. § 9-307(2), see infra
notes 292-334 and accompanying text.
1" See Gary Aircraft Corp. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp. (In re Gary Aircraft Corp.),
681 F.2d 365, 369-70 (5th Cir. 1982) (reasoning with cited authority that the intent of
Congress is determinative in deciding whether a federal statute preempts a conflicting
state statute under the supremacy clause, article V of the United States Constitu-
tion), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3110 (1983).
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ness.1'5 Although the federal legislation may not support the
court's interpretation of the 1958 Act with regard to preemp-
tion and priority, the policies behind the Act would not sanc-
tion the impunity with which buyers in the ordinary course of
business ignore the FAA registry.160 By stating that "all per-
sons are deemed to have notice of [a filed instrument's] exis-
tence and its effect on title to the property covered
thereby,""1 Congress made plain its intent that filing with the
FAA gives constructive notice of the contents of the filed doc-
ument to all persons.
2. The Arguments for Partial Federal Preemption.
The majority of state and federal courts now hold that the
1958 Act preempts only the filing and recording provisions of
the UCC and that the UCC governs priorites among lien
claimants.16 2 The courts employ several arguments to support
the theory that the UCC governs the priority question. The
differences in reasoning affect the further determination re-
garding which state's law should control.""
's' See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
'" In every case discussed in this comment, one of the parties had failed to check
the federal register for title to new aircraft purchased from dealers even though often
they both knew how and had done so previously (especially, lenders experienced in
financing the purchase of used aircraft from non-dealers). See, e.g., Tex. Nat'l Bank
of Houston v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599, 601 (E.D. Ark. 1964) (neither the pur-
chasers nor the purchase money lender checked the federal records); Haynes v. Gen.
Elec. Credit Corp., 432 F. Supp. 763, 764 (W.D. Va. 1977), a/i'd per curiam, 582 F.2d
869 (4th Cir. 1978) (buyer failed to search the federal registry); Cessna Fin. Corp. v.
Skyways Enter., Inc., 580 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Ky. 1979) (lender who was experienced in
title searches on aircraft did not perform one because buyer whom it financed was a
buyer in the ordinary course of business).
'1' 1964 REPORT, supra note 54, at 2320.
161 See Sigman, supra note 101, at 338-76 (setting out the number of court deci-
sions favoring preemption of state law by the 1958 Act versus the number of court
decisions favoring only partial preemption as of 1973; the author has analyzed this
using categories of plaintiffs and defendants based on type of alleged claim in the
aircraft).
'$3 The Ninth Circuit recently avoided determining which of three state laws con-
trolled the resolution of priority among lien claimants. In CIM Int'l v. United States,
641 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1980) the court held that the UCC governed the suit brought
in federal court. The court did not specify which state's laws applied, because the
UCC had been adopted by all three states whose law potentially governed the contro-
versy. Id. at 675. This is unsatisfactory because case law could differ on such things as
the interpretation of the UCC language or burden of proof. See, e.g., Bank of Lexing-
1983] COMMENTS
a. The Continuing Vitality of Common Law as a Reason
for Partial Preemption.
One court has held that state law governs disputes among
lien claimants in aircraft under the theory that the common
law priority scheme has continuing validity. The fedeial dis-
trict court in Texas National Bank of Houston v.
Aufderheide164 held that section 503 of the 1958 Act'" did not
repeal the general common law of chattel mortgages. 66 In
Aufderheide, a dealer financed its stock of new planes with an
inventory lender who filed a lien on the aircraft with the
FAA. 1 67 A partnership subsequently purchased an aircraft
from the dealer by financing the purchase price with a
bank.168 The bank did not record its mortgage until the con-
troversy arose. 1 9 The court first determined that section 506
of the 1958 Act 70 determined only which state's law governed
the "initial" or "inherent" validity of security agreements, 7
and then decided that section 503 does not govern the validity
of instruments as to third parties or the priority of a recorded
interest as to other lien claimants. 7 ' By using unique reason-
ing,17 3 the court concluded that general common law of chattel
ton v. Jack Adams Aircraft Sales, Inc., 570 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1978) (deciding among
the possible laws - the U.C.C. as adopted in five states and the common law which
differed on a critical issue at bar - that the U.C.C. as adopted by the state of the
locale applied to resolve the controversy).
235 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Ark. 1964).
See supra note 45 for text of § 1403.
' 235 F. Supp at 603.
Id. at 600.
1Id.
119 Id. at 600-01.
170 See supra note 55 for text of § 1406.
171 The court spoke in terms of contract doctrines of legal enforceability. 235 F.
Supp. at 603.
1' The court noted that section 1403 may have a "substantial bearing" on the va-
lidity and priority issues by virtue of determining proper filing of security instru-
ments. The court stated that "the validity as to third persons .. . and the relative
rights of claimants to such aircraft, to the extent that such rights are dependent upon
the fact or time of recordation . . . are matters which are governed by the federal
statute rather than by local law." Id.
'73 Aufderheide is the only case in which a court reasoned that general common
law governs priorities among lien claimants. Only one case resembles the reasoning in
Aufderheide although it concludes that U.C.C. § 9-307 governs the priority system. In
Northern Ill. Corp. v. Bishop Distrib. Co., 284 F. Supp. 121 (W.D. Mich. 1968) three
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mortgages controlled because the 1958 Act had not repealed
this law.17  The court cited general propositions of chattel
mortgage law175 which are consistent with the buyer in the or-
dinary course doctrine,"76 and held for the partnership as a
buyer in the ordinary course of business.177
b. The Use of the Erie Doctrine as a Reason for Partial
Preemption.
Unlike the court in Aufderheide,'7 the federal district court
in United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. WTAE Fly-
ing Club"" held that state law applied to determine priority
among lien claimants."" In WTAE, a dealer financed an air-
craft with an inventory loan.' 8' The inventory lender filed its
parties filed their interests with the FAA: the dealer's floor plan lender, the buyer and
the purchase money lender. The court held that the purchaser and his lender had
priority under U.C.C. § 9-307 because the rights of a buyer in the ordinary course do
not depend on the fact or time of filing and, therefore, are unaffected by the 1958
Act. The court cited Aufderheide as authority for this proposition. Id. at 124.
"7 The court reasoned "[ilt does not follow, however, that section 1403 has re-
pealed or abolished the general rule of chattel mortgage law . 235 F. Supp. at
603.
' The court cited 15 AM. JUR. 2D Chattel Mortgages §§ 150, 151, 153, re-edited as
68 AM. JUR. 2d Secured Transactions §§ 192-200 (1976) and 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mort-
gages § 262 (1939) supporting the propositions of substantive law.
176 The court conceded that the general propositions were similar to U.C.C. § 9-
307(1) but it stated that Texas had not yet adopted the U.C.C. 235 F. Supp. at 604.
11" 235 F. Supp. at 605. The court explained that the public policy behind protec-
tion of the buyer in the ordinary course granted such buyers the valid assumption
that the dealer is authorized to convey the goods purchased free and clear of third
party interests. The court stated:
Ordinarily, when a person goes into a merchant's place of business to
make a purchase, whether it be of an automobile, a television set, a
washing machine, or a pound of nails, the purchaser ought to have the
right to assume that the merchant has a right to sell the commodity in
question and should not be required to make a record search before
purchasing or to see to it that the merchant obtains a valid release of
the item from a bank floor plan before delivering it to the purchaser
and receiving his money or obligation. The Court sees no reason why
that right should not extend to the purchaser of an airplane who buys
if from a recognized dealer from a regular inventory or display and in
the ordinary course of business.
Id. at 604.
"7 See supra notes 164-77 and accompanying text.
o 300 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
Id. at 346 n.5.
'6' Id. at 344.
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lien with the FAA. 182 A member of an unincorporated associa-
tion purchased the aircraft from the dealer and made it avail-
able to the association,'8 " which in turn sought a loan from a
bank to repay its member the cost of the plane. 84 Instead of
paying the proceeds of the loan to the designated member and
without that member's knowledge, the bank paid the inven-
tory lender to obtain release of its recorded lien. 8 5 The associ-
ation sought to obtain the proceeds of the loan.'
The court in WTAE first determined that questions regard-
ing the validity of the bank's mortgage were resovled under
state law, 8 7 reasoning that under the doctrine of Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Tomkins,'8 8 state law controlled the controversy.'89
The court did not explain how the Erie doctrine impacted the
1958 Act's recording provisions and cited case law which did
not mention Erie. 90 The court then noted that the relevant
state law, U.C.C. section 9-307(1), 19 protected the buyer in
the ordinary course of business and terminated the inventory
lender's lien."' Holding that the association's bank had negli-
gently paid the prior but invalid lien, the court found the
bank obligated to the association for the full amount. 9 3
The court's rationale for applying state law over the 1958
Act is suspect. The court in WTAE failed to explain and sup-
182 Id.
153 Id. at 343.
184 Id,
"'5 The amount of the loan was $6,000. The bank paid $5,000 to the prior lienor.
Id. at 344.
1$1 Id. at 345.
187 Id. at 346 n.5.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
'' 300 F. Supp. at 346 n.5. The court stated "[a]ll questions respecting the validity
of the Bank's aircraft chattel mortgage are addressed to state law under the doctrine
of Erie R. Co. v. Tomkins . . .notwithstanding the federal aircraft recording statute,
§ 503(d) .... Id.
190 Id.
" The court did not utilize 49 U.S.C. § 1406, supra note 55, because it was en-
acted after the relevant part of the underlying transaction in WTAE occured. 300 F.
Supp. at 348 n.7.
191 Id. at 348.
'93 Id. at 346. One of WTAE's members had obtained $2,200 repayment from the
dealer's lender. The member paid this to WTAE's bank less his expenses of $224.60
incurred in obtaining the repayment. The remaining amount at issue with accrued
interest was $4,149.40. Id. at 345.
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port adequately its use of the Erie doctrine,194 and did not
explain why an act of Congress could not preempt a state law
even if the state law would otherwise control under the Erie
doctrine.
c. The Use of Section 506 of the 1958 Act to Apply State
Law to Controversies between Lien Claimants.
Several state and federal courts have reasoned that section
506 of the 1958 Act1 95 federalized the choice of law for suits
involving lien claimants in aircraft. In Sanders v. M.D. Air-
craft Sales, Inc.,196 a dealer executed a floor plan mortgage on
its inventory in favor of an inventory lender. 97 The mortgage,
which the lender filed with the FAA, permitted the dealer to
sell the financed inventory without the lender's consent unless
the dealer was in default on its payments. 98 A purchaser
bought an aircraft from the dealer,1 99 and the inventory lender
subsequently asserted its lien in the aircraft to be superior to
the buyer's title when the lender discovered that the dealer
was in default.2 00 The trial court held that section 503 of the
1958 Act totally preempted state law, and therefore displaced
U.C.C. section 9-307(1), which the court acknowledged would
have protected the buyer.210
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's holding concluding that only the 1958 Act's recording
provisions preempt state law.2 02 The court reasoned that Con-
gress intended section 506 to determine which state law con-
trolled controversies between lien claimants.0 3 The court
stated that "Congress has sensibly federalized choice of law,
thereby freeing aircraft financing from the forum shopping
which the rule of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co....
"I See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
'" 49 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976). See supra note 55 for the text of § 1406.
575 F.2d 1086 (3d Cir. 1978).
"o Id. at 1087.
190 Id. at 1087-88.
I" Id.





might otherwise produce."2"' The court quoted the legislative
history of section 506 in support of this proposition but did
not explain how it lent support. 05
The appellate court glossed over a serious difficulty in its
rationale. It incorrectly stated that the legislative history of
section 506 says that the "legal effect"20 of filing was left to
state law.2 0 7 In reality, the text of section 506208 and the Sen-
ate Report 0 9 use the ambiguous term "validity" to describe
vaguely the ramifications of filing pursuant to section 503.210
Section 506 appears only to determine the choice of law gov-
erning the legal enforceability of a security agreement as be-
tween the parties to the agreement," and not as among mul-
tiple lien claimants in a subsequent lawsuit.21 2 Although two
recent cases s relied on Sanders, the court's failure to accu-
I" Id. The court cited Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496
(1941) in which the Supreme Court held that the conflict of laws rules to be applied
by federal courts in diversity cases must conform to the prevailing rules of the forum
state in which the federal court sits pursuant to Erie R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
205 1964 REPORT, supra note 54, at 2319-20.
'o 575 F.2d at 1088.
201 1964 REPORT, supra note 54, at 2319-20.
200 49 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976). See supra note 55 for the text of § 1406.
209 1964 REPORT, supra note 54, at 2319-20.
210 See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
"I See Tex. Nat'l Bank of Houston v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599, 603 (E.D.
Ark. 1964) (holding that compliance with § 503 does not validate a security instru-
ment that is otherwise invalid under state law because, pursuant to § 506, "inherent
or original validity must be determined by reference to applicable State law").
"' The defect in the proposition appears when multiple parties to the litigation
have properly perfected security instruments delivered in different states. See supra
note 42 for examples. 49 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976) does not contain provisions to resolve
such conflict of laws questions.
2" In Bitzer-Croft Motors, Inc. v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d 1, 401
N.E.2d 1340 (1980), dealer-1 purchased an aircraft from dealer-2. Dealer-1 arranged
financing for the sale with a purchase lender. On the same day as this sale, dealer-2
executed a chattel mortgage to dealer-2's inventory lender. The inventory lender ex-
tended the loan only after checking the FAA register to determine that dealer-2's title
was unencumbered, and then filed its lien documents with the FAA. Shortly after-
wards, the purchase lender sought to file its purchase mortgage documents, but
checked the FAA registry by telephone and discovered title papers had been filed (by
the inventory lender) but not yet recorded. While dealer-1 and its lender sought to
have dealer-2 clear its title, the inventory lender repossessed the aircraft because
dealer-2 defaulted on its loan. Dealer-1 and its lender sought to possess the aircraft
by suit. The court held that state law governed the controversy. The court cited
Sanders and reasoned that 49 U.S.C. § 1406 provided that state law should govern
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rately read the legislative history debilitates the court's
conclusion.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in CIM International
v. United States' addressed the scope of section 506 and
held that it requires courts to resolve priority disputes under
state law. In CIM International, the alleged owner of an air-
craft sought to prevent its sale after the aircraft had been
seized by the government to satisfy a tax lien against a third-
party taxpayer.21 5 Because the United States had not filed its
tax lien with the FAA,216 the owner did not discover the lien
although it had searched the FAA register prior to purchasing
the aircraft.2 17 The third-party taxpayer never had made any
payment on its note and did not have any equity interest in
the aircraft.2 8 The owner bought the aircraft by purchasing
the dealer's mortgage on the plane and obtaining a bill of sale
from the delinquent taxpayer.2 " Two months before the gov-
ernment repossessed the aircraft, the owner had filed its own-
ership registration certificate with the FAA.2 20 The owner
sought an injunction preventing the tax sale and a decree re-
quiring the government to return the aircraft it had allegedly
wrongfully seized.221
the title dispute. Applying U.C.C. § 9-307(1), the court found that dealer-1 was pro-
tected as a buyer in the ordinary course of business even though it also was a dealer.
In Shackett v. Philco Aviation, Inc., 681 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 103 S. Ct. 2476 (1983), the Seventh Circuit, citing Sanders, held that 49
U.S.C. § 1006 determined choice of laws for the controversy. For a discussion of the
facts and the Supreme Court opinion, see supra note 37 and infra note 269.
214 641 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1980).
I' d. at 673.
210 This was pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 49.17(a) (1982) (which exempts United States'
tax liens from the 49 U.S.C. § 1403 filing requirements) and 49 U.S.C. §§
6323(f)(1)(A)(ii), (f)(2)(B) (1976) (requiring the United States to file tax liens with
the Secretary of State, not with the FAA).
" 641 F.2d at 673.
218 Id.
"' The dealer had assigned its security interest in the aircraft to the bank. The
bank reassigned the security interest to the dealer for consideration and release of the
dealer's recourse obligation. The release and reassignment were not filed with the
FAA until one month after the Government seized the aircraft, although the owner
had obtained it eight months prior to seizure. Id.
220 Id.
1' The owner had loaned the aircraft to the delinquent taxpayer who had a pilot
fly the plane to Santa Anna, California to pick up the taxpayer's wife and personal
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The court in CIM held that state law applied to the lawsuit
pursuant to section 506.22 It reasoned that the language"'3
and history224 of section 506 indicated that section 503 was
merely a recording statute. 25 The opinion also criticized the
government's argument that section 506 should be more nar-
rowly interpreted to govern only the validity of interests on
file.'22 The court reasoned that if section 506 only governed
filed instruments, no law would be applicable to unfiled docu-
ments. 227 Accordingly the court held a conclusion of law which
was favorable to the government to be erroneous. 228 By as-
suming that no law would govern subsequent suits unless
specified in section 506, the court ignored conflicts of laws
resolutions.
d. The Use of Section 1106 to Apply State Law to
Controversies Among Lien Claimants.
The Appellate Court of Indiana in Crescent City Aviation,
Inc. v. Beverly Bank 22  applied state law remedies as permit-
ted in section 110630 to resolve a priority conflict between
belongings. En route the plane developed an oil leak, landed for repair and was seized
by the Government. Id.
US Id. at 675.
,11 See supra note 55 for text of § 1406.
" 1964 REPORT, supra note 54, at 2319-20.
"' 641 F.2d at 675 n.6. The court glibly stated that the three possibly applicable
laws were all versions of the UCC, so the court relied upon and cited to the UCC in
its unadopted form without identifying which forum's laws controlled the contro-
versy. Id. See infra notes 278-84 and accompanying text.
224 Id. The United States argued that the release and reassignment that the bank
executed in favor of the dealer was void because the owner filed it after the govern-
ment seized the aircraft. Apparently, to bolster this argument, the United States
sought to persuade the court that § 1406 related only to instruments on file.
21" Id. Cf. Idabel Nat'l Bank v. Tucker, 544 P.2d 1287, 1289-90 (Okla. Ct. App.
1975) (relying on Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1270, 1275 (1968), after quoting § 1406 and its
legislative history without any comment, to hold that the Oklahoma commercial code,
a version of the UCC, controlled the controversy and protected a buyer in the ordi-
nary course of business).
1" 641 F.2d at 676.
2O 139 Ind. App. 669, 219 N.E.2d 446 (1966).
23o Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-726, tit. XI, § 1106, 72 Stat. 731, 798
(1958) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1976)). This section provides that "[nlothing
contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing
at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to
such remedies." Id.
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claimants. In Crescent City Aviation, a dealer sold an aircraft
to a buyer under a retail installment contract.231 The dealer
sold the financing paper to a bank which promptly recorded it
with the Federal Aviation Administration." The buyer
brought the aircraft back to the dealer for repairs, including
removal of two engines, installation of one new engine, and
other services and material. " The dealer/repairman sought to
perfect its lien for repair charges by filing a notice of mechan-
ic's lien with the local county recorder and retaining posses-
sion of the plane,3 4 and then sought to foreclose its mechan-
ic's lien against the financing bank .23  The trial court granted
the bank's replevin action and invalidated the dealer/repair-
man's lien.30
The appellate court in Crescent City observed that section
1106 provides that the 1958 Act does not exclude other com-
mon law or statutory remedies.2 37 Reading section 1106 and
section 506 together,3 the court determined that state law
remedies were available to those that give notice by filing with
the FAA.23 9 The court determined that an instrument is not
"valid" against anyone until filed pursuant to the 1958 Act.2 40
Therefore, the court held that although state remedies were
available under section 1106, a party that failed to file could
not invoke them.24' The rationale of the court in Crescent
City is persuasive because it is based on federal preemption of
the filing provisions of the UCC and employs the statutory
authority of section 1106 to utilize state law in adjudicating
controversies among claimants to aircraft interests.







Is See supra note 229 for text of § 1506.
"I See supra note 55 for text of § 1406.
: 219 N.E.2d at 449.
I40 id. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
219 N.E.2d at 449.
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e. The Incompleteness of Section 503.
1. Judicial Decisions.
A growing number of recent decisions have determined that
state versions of the UCC govern controversies among claim-
ants to aircraft interests because of the incompleteness of sec-
tion 503. In Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp.
(In re Gary Aircraft Corp.)2 42 the Fifth Circuit thoroughly ex-
amined the 1958 Act and the UCC and held that the latter
applied to determine priorities. 243 The president of the bank-
rupt corporation had purchased two aircraft2" in his individ-
ual capacity from a dealer in aircraft.245 An inventory lender
financed the dealer's aircraft under a security agreement that
permitted the dealer to sell the collateral2 46 unless he was in
default on his loan.2 4' The vice-president of the bankrupt re-
quested a title search on the two aircraft the day that the
president purchased the second plane.2 4s The president trans-
ferred the aircraft to the bankrupt corporation, which exe-
cuted a mortgage in favor of a purchase money lender.2 4 e Both
lenders timely recorded their mortgages with the Federal Avi-
ation Authority.2 50 After declaring bankruptcy, the bankrupt
requested permission to sell the two aircraft free and clear of
the inventory lender's lien. 25 ' The bankruptcy court, affirmed
242 681 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3110 (1983).
243 Id. The Supreme Court recently commented on Gary in Philco Aviation, Inc. v.
Shachet, 103 S. Ct. 2476, 2480 (1983). See supra note 37 and infra note 269.
244 Four aircraft were purchased but only two were in controversy in Gary. Id. at
367.
245 Id.
248 The dealer executed the security agreement in favor of the inventory lender on
February 20, 1969. The FAA recorded the security agreement on March 3, 1969. The
president of the bankrupt purchased the first plane on December 22, 1971 and the
second one on January 4, 1972. The vice-president of the bankrupt requested a title
search on January 4, 1972. Id.
" The court assumed that at the time of sale the dealer had defaulted on its loan
from the inventory lender, and therefore was not authorized to transfer the collateral.
Id. at 367 n.l.
2I Id. at 367. See supra note 246. For four years the vice-president of the bank-
rupt requested the dealer to secure the release of the inventory lender's security in-
terest without results. Id. at 367.
249 Id.
280 Id.
"I" Id. at 367-68.
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by the district court, held that the bankrupt was entitled to
the aircraft and the proceeds of its sale.215
The Fifth Circuit held on appeal that the 1958 Act did not
preempt state priorities, and that the inventory lender's lien
terminated when the president of the bankrupt bought in the
ordinary course of business.'5" Acknowledging that the 1958
Act provided the exclusive method of perfecting secured inter-
ests in aircraft by filing the title documents with the FAA, 54
the Fifth Circuit noted, however, that courts disfavor federal
preemption of state law. 55 The court reasoned that, absent a
compelling showing that Congress intended such preemp-
tion, 56 state law would govern.257 After a thorough examina-
tion of the language of section 503, the court found the statute
ambiguous 258 because the word "validity" did not necessarily
establish a priority system. 2 9
The court in Gary compared 6 0 the 1958 Act with the Ship
I'= ld. at 368.
*53 Id. at 377.
*" Id. at 368. See supra note 36.
go$ The court cited Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S.
311, 315-16 (1981). In Kalo Brick & Tile an interstate common carrier by rail de-
fended against a brick manufacturer's allegations of state law violations by asserting
that the Interstate Commerce Act wholly preempted state law. The trial court agreed
and dismissed the suit. The state appellate court reversed and the state supreme
court denied the railroad's application for review. The Supreme Court granted cer-
tioari and held that preemption of state law by federal statute is not favored unless
persuasive reasons exist for preemption. The Supreme Court found that the Inter-
state Commerce Act preempted the state law because the pervasive and comprehen-
sive federal legislation was inconsistent with the state law.
'" The court cited Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978). In Ma-
lone the Supreme Court had to decide whether a Minnesota state pension law had
been preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The Court held that
preemption under the Supremacy Clause depended on the intent of Congress. When
Congress does not clearly state its intent to preempt state laws, the Court stated,
courts normally sustain the local law. The Court held in Malone that the NLRA did
not preempt the Minnesota statute.
"' 681 F.2d at 369-70.
Id. at 370.
I' ld. at 371. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
100 U.C.C. § 9-104 comment 1 (1977), supra note 100, invites this comparison in
explanation for the Code drafters' position that the 1958 Act does not preempt the
UCC priority system. See Sigman, supra note 101, at 327-36 (comparing the record-
ing and priority provisions, if any, of the Ship Mortgage Act, the Interstate Com-
merce Act, the Patent and Copyright Statutes and the Assignment of Claims Act).
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Mortgage Act 2 1 to further examine Congress' intent in enact-
ing section 503 of the 1958 Act. The court found that the re-
cording provisions of both Acts were similarly worded and
structured, 2  but that two other sections of the Ship Mort-
gage Act"' established priorities among lien claimants.2"4 The
court then reasoned that the Congressional enactment of
these other sections in the Ship Mortgage Act implied that
the recording provisions of the Ship Mortgage Act did not es-
tablish priorities.265 Further, the court inferred that the close
similarity between the 1958 Act and the Ship Mortgage Act
recording provisions defeated a compelling showing that Con-
gress considered the 1958 Act filing provisions to establish pri-
orities that the equivalent Ship Mortgage Act provision did
not establish." 6 The court in Gary, therefore, concluded that
Congress did not intend the 1958 Act to preempt the priori-
-" 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-984 (1976).
2 681 F.2d at 371-72. The recording provision of the Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 921(a) (1976), provides:
(a) No sale, conveyance, or mortgage which, at the time such sale, con-
veyance, or mortgage is made, includes a vessel of the United States,
or any promotion thereof, as the whole or any part of the property
sold, conveyed or mortgaged shall be valid, in respect to such vessel,
against any person other than the grantor or mortgagor, his heir or
devisee, and a person having actual notice thereof, until such bill of
sale, conveyance, or mortgage is recorded in the office of the collector
of customs of the port of documentation of such vessel, as provided in
subsection (b) of this section.
Id. The similarity with 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c) (1976) is as follows: "No ... conveyance..
. shall be valid . . . against any person other than . . . person having actual notice
thereof, until ... ["filed for recordation" (1958 Act); "recorded" (SMA)] in the office
of [the relevant government agency] .. . ." Compare with the full text of 49 U.S.C. §
1403 (1976), supra note 45.
"3 46 U.S.C. § 922 (defining preferred mortgage), § 953(b) (providing that the pre-
ferred mortgage has priority in the proceeds of judicial sale of a vessel over all claims
except court costs and preferred maritime liens).
1" 681 F.2d at 371-72.
26 Id.
I" Id. The court reasoned that if the supposed priorities established by the filing
provision of the 1958 Act were similarly established by the equivalent SMA provision,
the later provisions in the SMA would be both contradictory and repetitive of other
provisions in the SMA. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that this clearly demonstrates that
Congress did not consider the SMA filing provisions to establish priorities among lien
claimats. Further, the court reasoned, this analogy to the 1958 Act seriously under-
mined the argument that Congress would consider the nearly identical 1958 Act's
filing provision to establish a priority system. Id. at 372.
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ties established by state law. 67 The Fifth Circuit resolved the
dispute in Gary by holding that the priority granted to a
buyer in the ordinary course of business protected the presi-
dent of the bankrupt,268 and that the bankrupt took clear title
from the president 2'9 pursuant to the UCC 2 70
The Gary rationale, that the 1958 Act lacks the provisions
necessary for a complete priority scheme which would pre-
empt state law, has been articulated in other cases. In a brief
opinion on a summary judgment motion in Aircraft Invest-
ment Corp. v. Pezzani & Reid Equipment Co.,271 Chief Judge
Levin of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan held that viewing the 1958 Act as totally preempt-
ing state law was "erroneous. 2 72 The court stated that the
lack of priority provisions in the 1958 Act left the existence
207 Id.
'" See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
'" This was pursuant to U.C.C. § 2-403(d) (1977) which provides that "[a] pur-
chaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer...
." The inventory lender argued that the bankrupt was only a buyer not in the ordi-
nary course of business, U.C.C. § 9-307(2), and, therefore, the inventory lender's lien
deserved priority over the bankrupt's title. The court rebutted this, holding that the
inventory lender's lien on the aircraft transferred to the proceeds of the sale but was
extinguished in the aircraft when the president of the bankrupt, a buyer in the ordi-
nary course, purchased the aircraft. The court held that the subsequent transaction
between the president and the bankrupt could not resurrect the lien. 681 F.2d at 372.
Although the Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari in Gary, the Court men-
tioned Gary in Philco Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. 2476, 2480 (1983), dis-
cussed supa note 37. The Court distinguished Gary as deciding whether the 1958
Act's priority scheme, if any, preempted state law (UCC) priorities for title and se-
cured interests in aircraft. 103 S. Ct. at 2480. The Court did not pass on the issue of
priorities which was not before it in Philco, but stated "[w]e are inclined to agree
with this rationale [in Gary]." Id. The Court noted that the Fifth Circuit in Gary
interpreted "validity" in section 503(d) of the 1958 Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1403(d)(1976), as
not meaning "priority," but only such "validity" as state law granted. Id. at 2480 n.6.
See supra notes 39-42 and 49-52 and accompanying texts. The Court then strongly
indicated that state law governs priority disputes stating that "[allthough state law
determines priorities, all interests must be federally recorded before they can obtain
whatever priority to which they are entitled under state law." Id. at 2480. Thus the
Supreme Court implicitly approved Gary in dicta.
270 681 F.2d at 372.
171 205 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
"I Id. at 82. A buyer purchased a new aircraft from a dealer. The dealer had
financed his inventory with an inventory lender. The day after the completed sale,
the inventory lender filed its chattel mortgage with the FAA. Subsequently the dealer
became bankrupt and the inventory lender sought to enforce its lien against the air-
craft held by the buyer.
COMMENTS
and effectiveness of state priority laws unimpaired .1 3 The
court concluded that "[i]f the purported chattel mortgage is
void [against a competing secured party] under the appropri-
ate state law, federal recording will not save it. '" 274 In Feld-
man v. Philadelphia National Bank,7 5 the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania also summarily
rejected the view that the 1958 Act totally preempted state
law governing priorities among claimants to interests in air-
craft. 276 The court reasoned that the 1958 Act lacked certain
remedies, which indicated Congress intended state law reme-
dies to govern controversies concerning priorities among
claimants to aircraft interests. 7
Courts that hold state law governs must determine which
state law applies. 8 Some courts have recognized that section
506 of the 1958 Act279 determines the controlling law on ques-
tions regarding the enforceability of a security agreement be-
tween parties to the agreement.280 Under the rule of Klaxon,
however, courts have held that the law governing the locale of
the collateral governs the issues at bar pursuant to the
UCC.28 Klaxon held that the law of the forum state in which
the federal district court sits controls controversies brought
273 Id.
'74 Id.
:75 408 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
76 In Feldman the trustee in bankruptcy sought lease payments made to a bank
by a third party pursuant to an unrecorded lease which had been assigned by the
bankrupt to the bank. The trustee's theory was that the lease and its assignment
must have been recorded with the FAA to be valid. The trustee further argued that
the bankrupt's creditors were entitled to the lease payments since the assignment of
lease had not been filed with the FAA. Id. at 26-27.
277 Id. at 32. This is the inverse of the statutory provision, 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1976),
that the FAA does not curtail state law remedies. See supra notes 229-41 and accom-
panying text. The court concluded that under state law the assignee of a lease pre-
vailed over the trustee in bankruptcy representing creditors of the assignor of the
lease and was entitled to the rent as proceeds under U.C.C. § 9-306(2). Id. at 37-39.
278 Cf. Sanders v. M.D. Aircraft Sales, 575 F.2d 1086, 1088 (3d Cir. 1978), discussed
supra notes 195-213 and accompanying text (holding that state law of the place of
delivery of the security interest governed the controversy).
'T, See supra note 55 for text of statute.
280 No case or law review article discussed by this author that dealt with sections
503-506 of the 1958 Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1403-1406 (1976), involved a dispute between
the parties to a security agreement.
26, U.C.C. § 9-102 (1977).
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into federal court.282 In another instance, a bankruptcy court
resolved the dispute not according to the rationale in Klaxon
but according to the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts §
251.283 There the court held that a state's laws, other than
those of the locale in which the collateral was located, con-
trolled.0 4 These cases reflect just some of the conflicts faced
by courts which hold that state law is applicable.
2. Comment
The persuasive merit of the rationale for partial preemp-
tion, discussed above, varies according to the support each
theory has in the language and legislative history of the 1958
Act. Courts that articulate the weakest and least followed the-
ories for allowing state law to govern priorities base their rea-
soning on the continued viability of common law 85 or the Erie
doctrine.2" The argument that section 506 of the 1958 Act
designates state law to govern priority conflicts among all par-
ties to a subsequent lawsuit, even those not a party to the
282 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), supra note 204. See, e.g.,
Bank of Lexington v. Jack Adams Aircraft Sales, Inc., 570 F.2d 1220, 1225 (5th Cir.
1978) (reasoning that under Klaxon some state law would control, and that Missis-
sippi's UCC controlled because all five possible controlling states had adopted the
UCC (§ 9-102) which designated the law governing the locale of the collateral as con-
trolling the disposition of suits).
213 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 251 (1971). The section provides:
Validity and Effect of Security Interest in Chattel
(1) The validity and effect of a security interest in a chattel as be-
tween the immediate parties are determined by the local law of the
state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most signifi-
cant relationship to the parties, the chattel and the security interest
under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, greater
weight will usually be given to the location of the chattel at the time
that the security interest attached than to any other contact in deter-
mining the state of the applicable law.
Id.
284 Danning v. Pacific Propeller, Inc. (In re Holiday Airlines Corp.), 620 F.2d 731,
733-34 (9th Cir.) (holding that Washington's possessory, artisan lien laws governed
the validity of the subsequent (Washington) repairman's lien, but that California's
law governed all other aspects of the suit because it bore a more significant relation-
ship to the parties, the chattel and the security interest), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900
(1980).
282 See supra notes 164-78 and accompanying text.
326 See supra notes 179-94 and accompanying text.
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document filed with the FAA, s1 appears to read too much
federal choice of law into the statute. The words of the statute
and the legislative history indicate that Congress intended
section 506 to determine only the state laws under which par-
ties must draft their security and title documents.2 88 The
novel approach of using section 1106, which leaves state com-
mon law and state statutory remedies coexistent with the 1958
Act's remedies, to conclude that state law priorities are not
preempted relies more directly on the literal language of the
1958 Act than the argument for using section 506.289 The UCC
drafters,29 0 however, articulate the most well-reasoned ration-
ale which has influenced the present trend in judicial reason-
ing.2 91 These courts hold that the 1958 Act simply is incom-
plete. They defer to state law to govern the determination of
priorities among lien claimants.
IV. ARGUMENTS AFFECTING PRIORITY ACCORDED A BUYER IN
THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS
Courts that hold state law governs the controversy among
claimants to interests in an aircraft do not thereby fully re-
solve the issues at bar. Concluding that the 1958 Act does not
contain a priority system that preempts state law does not de-
termine the effect of a lender's consent to a sale or a buyer's
notice, both of which may affect the status of the buyer in the
ordinary course of business. Courts have considered these ar-
guments and granted or denied a buyer protection from an
inventory lender's lien accordingly.
A. Lender's Consent or Estoppel
Regardless of whether the 1958 Act preempts state law,
some courts have held that floor plan lenders actually or im-
pliedly consent to dealers' sales to buyers. Floor plan financ-
ing contracts that permit a dealer to sell inventory without
287 49 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976). See supra note 55 for text of § 1406.
' See supra notes 206-13 and 226-27 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 229-41 and accompanying text.
88 See U.C.C. § 9-104 comment 1 (1977), supra note 100.
28 See supra note 242-77 and accompanying text.
19831
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
the lender's consent unless the dealer is in default conclu-
sively establish the lender's consent to a sale.2"2 Many courts
hold, however, that even a financing contract that forbids the
dealer from selling the aircraft without the lender's consent
does not negate the argument that the lender has consented
to the sale.29 Courts have found that inventory lenders im-
pliedly consented to dealer sales because the lenders knew
that the dealer intended to sell aircraft29 4 and satisfy the loan
with the proceeds of the sale.295 Some courts call this estoppel
and disallow the lender to enforce or assert its lien against the
buyer.29
The justification given by courts for preventing the lender
from recovering against a buyer in the ordinary course of busi-
ness was stated by the federal district court in Aufderheide:
"[o]rdinarily. . .the purchaser ought to have the right to as-
sume that the merchant has a right to sell the commodity in
question. '297 Courts holding in a manner similar to the one in
292 See Bitzer-Croft Motors, Inc. v. Pioneer Bank & Trust, 82 I1. App. 3d 1, 401
N.E.2d 1340, 1346-47 (1980) (holding that a chattel mortgage which specifically au-
thorized the sale of the chattel and referred to the UCC and the testimony of the
lender's loan officer that he contemplated the sale of the aircraft estopped the lender
from enforcing its lien in the aircraft against the purchaser).
293 See, e.g., Northern Ill. Corp. v. Bishop Distrib. Co., 284 F. Supp. 121, 125 (W.D.
Mich. 1968) (stating simply that the lender knew the dealer purchased the aircraft
only to sell it and should, therefore, bear the loss instead of the buyer); State Sec. Co.
v. Aviation Enters., Inc., 355 F.2d 225, 229 (10th Cir. 1966) (expressing its holding in
terms of estoppel). But see Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 594, 476 P.2d
401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970) (holding that total preemption by the 1958 Act negated a
purchaser's status as a buyer in the ordinary course of business, without considering
the implied consent of the distributor that retained title under a conditional sale
contract which forbade resale without the lender's consent), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
823 (1971), discussed supra notes 134-52 and accompanying text.
.9. See Bishop, 284 F. Supp. 121, 125 (W.D. Mich. 1968). But see O'Neil v. Barnett
Bank of Jacksonville, 360 So. 2d 150, 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), discussed supra
notes 122-33 and accompanying text (holding that a lender did not actually or im-
pliedly consent to the sale of an aircraft that was not part of the dealer's inventory
(this was known to the buyer) and not part of the floor plan financing).
"I State Securities, 335 F.2d 225, 227 (10th Cir. 1966).
296 Id. See Suburban Trust & Savings Bank v. Campbell, 19 Ohio Misc. 74, 250
N.E.2d 118, 120-22 (Ohio C.P. 1969) (holding in addition to estoppel that the lender's
renewal of the note with the dealer subsequent to the sale waived the prohibition
against resale in the prior note and was a novation between the lender and dealer).
"' See Texas Nat'l Bank of Houston v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599, 604 (E.D.
Ark. 1964), discussed supra notes 164-77 and accompanying text.
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Aufderheide free buyers in the ordinary course of business
from the duty to search the record to ascertain the status of
title in the goods.29' For example, even if a buyer in the ordi-
nary course of business knew the sale to him violated the
dealer's ownership rights and the lender's security interest, a
court has held that the buyer has the right to assume the
seller will pay off the secured party and obtain a release of the
security interest to convey clear title to the buyer.2 99 Protect-
ing the buyer in the ordinary course of business to the extent
of holding him free of a known security interest at the time of
purchase indicates the favor courts bestow on buyers, since it
clearly goes beyond the protection provided by the UCC.
30 0
B. Constructive Notice
The constructive notice resulting from filing interests in air-
craft with the FAA may deprive a buyer in the ordinary
course of business of UCC protection. The difference between
the type of filing required under the 1958 Act and that re-
quired by the UCC may support an argument that the inven-
tory lender's lien should prevail over the interest of a buyer in
the ordinary course of business. Unlike the UCC's "notice
filing,"'3 0' the 1958 Act requires "transaction filing, ' 30 2 where
the whole title or security instrument is filed in a fashion sim-
ilar to that required by pre-UCC chattel mortgage acts.3 03
29$ Id. See Suburban Trust & Savings Bank v. Campbell, 19 Ohio Misc. 74, 250
N.E.2d 118, 121 (Ohio C.P. 1969) (holding that because the purchaser was in the
ordinary course of business he had no duty to search the record); Northern I11. Corp.
v. Bishop Distrib. Co., 284 F. Supp. 121, 125 (W.D. Mich. 1968) (holding that the high
price of aircraft does not raise a duty in purchasers to search the title in the plane).
'" See Suburban Trust & Savings Bank v. Campbell, 19 Ohio Misc. 74, 250 N.E.2d
118, 122 (Ohio C.P. 1969) (stating that "[elven had the [buyer in the ordinary course
of business] known of the [floor plan lender's] lien filed with the Federal Aviation
Agency, he still had the right under the Uniform Commercial Code of Illinois to as-
sume that [the dealer] would pay the obligation owing to the plaintiff, obtain a re-
lease of plaintiff's lien so that defendant would have a clear title to the 'plane;" with-
out supporting citation to the UCC).
:00 See U.C.C. § 9-307(l) (1977), supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
301 See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
302 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. The 1958 Act is a transaction filing
statute by virtue of requiring that the entire security or title instrument be filed. See
49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976), supra note 45.
303 GILMORE, supra note 85, § 15.2 at 466-67.
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Logically, transaction filing provides more complete informa-
tion regarding the substance of the security interest than
notice filing which simply notifies that a security interest may
exist.' 4
In Dawson v. General Discount Corp.,0 5 a seller sold a
plane and assigned his rights to receive payment under a con-
ditional sales contract to a finance company, which filed ap-
propriate title instruments with the Civil Aeronautics Author-
ity.306 A second buyer subsequently purchased the plane30 7
and maintained possession of it.308 The finance company al-
leged wrongful retention and conversion of the aircraft against
the second buyer and sought damages.309 The Court of Ap-
peals of Georgia held that the 1938 Act, section 503,310 applied
to intrastate aircraft.' The court reasoned that under Geor-
gia real estate law, by recording a conditional sales contract, a
person gives "constructive notice of [the interested party's] ti-
tle by which the [subsequent purchaser] and all the world are
bound.13 2 The court enforced the secured party's lien against
the subsequent purchaser since he took subject to the prior,
perfected interest.313 The court did not hold that the 1938 Act
totally preempted the field of aircraft conveyancing, because
the court did not rely on the federal statute to determine the
legal effect of recording with the CAA.' "
Recently the Missouri Court of Appeals held that a buyer
304 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
305 82 Ga. App. 29, 60 S.E.2d 653 (1950).
30 60 S.E.2d 654-55.
307 The chain of title was: Dunlavy Flying Service or Bessemer Flying Service by
Dunlavy, Jr., or Dunlavy, Jr. in his individual capacity sold the aircraft to Clevenger
under a conditional sales contract, assigning his retained interest to General Dis-
count; Clevenger sold the aircraft to Dawson. Id.
3" Id. at 654.
:09 Id.
1 0 See supra note 30 for text of § 503, then 49 U.S.C. § 523.
"1 60 S.E.2d at 657-58. See supra note 101.
312 60 S.E.2d at 657-58.
313 This case preceded the UCC and, consequently, does not give sufficient facts to
know whether the seller, Dunlavy, Jr., was a dealer. It is possible that he was, but it is
likely that his flying service was his primary business. If Dawson was not purchasing
from a dealer, he was not buying in the ordinary course of business and U.C.C. § 9-
307(2) would produce the same result. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
3" 60 S.E.2d at 657-58.
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takes his aircraft subject to the perfected security interest of
any lien claimant who has recorded its lien with the FAA. In
J.C. Equipment, Inc. v. Sky Aviation, Inc.,31 a dealer agreed
to sell to a first buyer a Cherokee aircraft in return for cash
plus a trade-in of a Cessna airplane. 316 The dealer fraudu-
lently misrepresented the Cherokee, 17 which induced the first
buyer into the transaction.18 The first buyer traded its
Cessna, then discovered the fraud3 19 at approximately the
same time as the dealer interested a second buyer in purchas-
ing the Cessna. 20
Transactions occurred in close succession, after which time
the first buyer had the Cherokee and the second buyer had
the Cessna.3 2  The first buyer claimed that it had title to the
:15 498 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
316 Id. at 74.
31, The dealer represented that the aircraft could pass a Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration annual inspection. The dealer was to bear the cost of the inspection and any
necessary work. Subsequently, the first buyer learned through an inspection that the
aircraft had structural damage and had to be grounded until repaired. Id. at 74-75.
318 Id.
019 See supra note 317.
330 498 S.W.2d at 75. It is important to note that litigation between the first and
second buyers did not fall within the ambit of the UCC doctrine of the buyer in the
ordinary course of business. The appellate court only determined the good faith sta-
tus of the second buyer based on the constructive notice he had when the first buyer
filed a notice of recission with the FAA. See infra note 321. This is relevant, however,
to the definition of the buyer in the ordinary course of business, U.C.C. § 1-201(9),
because the definition incorporates the good faith requirement. See supra note 80.
8" The court carefully noted the time sequence. On October 15, 1969, the dealer
and the first buyer exchanged blank bills of sale in the two aircraft, and the dealer
delivered the Cherokee to the first buyer. On October 16, 1969, the first buyer exe-
cuted a notice of recission upon learning, that same day, of the dealer's fraud, and
mailed it to the FAA recording office in Oklahoma City. On October 17, 1969, the first
buyer's attorney mailed a letter to the dealer requesting no sale or encumbrance of
the Cessna until the repairs on the Cherokee were completed or the Cherokee was
returned. On October 20, 1969, the second buyer indicated his intent to purchase the
Cessna as a result of negotiations with the dealer. On October 21, 1969, the second
buyer's bank ordered a title search on the Cessna and learned that as of 3:10 p.m.
that day the title was in the first buyer. On October 22, 1969 at 10:09 a.m. (C.S.T),
the FAA received and filed the first buyer's notice of recission. That same day in
Arizona (two hours behind Oklahoma time) the second buyer and the dealer trans-
acted a sale of the Cessna at a bank. The first buyer still maintained possession of the
Cessna. On October 24 or 25, 1969, the Cessna was removed from the first buyer's
possession without its knowledge. On October 27, 1969, the second buyer received
possession of the Cessna. On October 30, 1969, the FAA recorded all the instruments
including the recission of sale filed by the first buyer. 498 S.W.2d at 75.
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Cessna, whereas the second buyer defended on the ground
that he purchased without knowledge of the first buyer's own-
ership.3 22 The trial court held for the second buyer, reasoning
that he was a good faith purchaser who had not received ac-
tual notice provided by the Federal Aviation Administration's
record at the time of sale. 23
The Missouri Court of Appeals in J.C. Equipment held that
under Missouri law "[a] prospective purchaser has construc-
tive notice of everything the instruments on file show with re-
spect to the chain of title. ' 324 The court reasoned that the
UCC excludes from the definition of a buyer in good faith a
purchaser who knows the sale to him violates the seller's own-
ership rights or the lender's security rights.2 5 The court con-
cluded that the second buyer was not entitled to protected
status if he purchased after the first buyer's recission was
filed 26 with the FAA.32 7 The court, therefore, reversed and re-
manded, instructing the lower court to determine the exact
time of the sale to the second buyer.
3 21
The court's analogy in J.C. Equipment between aircraft ti-
tle recording and land title recording has merit because both
land title recording acts and the 1958 Act require "transaction
filing" which gives public notice of the interests held by those
:22 Id. at 76.
I' ld.
Is ld.
32 Id. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1977), supra note 80.
326 The time of filing, not recordation, is the critical time under section 503 of the
1958 Act. See supra note 45 for text of § 503; note 48 and accompanying text (noting
change from time of recordation (1938 Act) to time of filing (1958 Act)).
"I At trial there had been no proof regarding the time of the sale to the second
buyer on October 22, 1969. The court took judicial notice by relevant state statutes of
the two hour time difference between Oklahoma and Arizona (due to time zone and
daylight savings time differences) and concluded that at 10:09 a.m. Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma when the first buyer's recission was filed it was 8:09 a.m. in Phoenix, Ari-
zona. Although the court did not conclude when the purchase occurred, it is unlikely
that the second buyer's purchase occurred before 8:09 a.m. because it was held in a
bank. 498 S.W.2d at 77 n.1.
02' The court held that under Missouri law the burden of proving innocent pur-
chaser status without notice or knowledge of fraud is upon the subsequent purchaser
where fraud in the original transfer is shown. Id. at 76. The remand was necessary to
permit the second buyer to establish that he was a good faith purchaser. Id. at 78.
COMMENTS
that have perfected their title by filing.329 The effect of UCC
"notice filing" does not determine the effect of constructive
notice under the 1958 Act. 3 ' In providing for state law to de-
termine the validity of a security or title document in section
506 of the 1958 Act, Congress stated the effect that it in-
tended filing to have:33 1
When the instrument has been filed for recordation under the
law, all persons are deemed to have notice of its existence and
its effect on title to the property covered thereby. Conse-
quently, to determine whether there are any encumbrances on
the aircraft, it is only necessary to consult the central file.3 32
The Senate's statement indicates Congress intended to resolve
the confusion surrounding the validity of filed instruments by
increasing the legal certainty of the effects of commercial
transactions."33 Congress intended section 506 to determine
3'9 This point is overlooked by two commentators on the federal filing requirement
for aircraft. They argue that the analogy is weak because aircraft are mobile and land
title recording is local and fragmented. See Scott, supra note 101, at 196 (arguing
only that transactions in land are not analogous to those in aircraft due to the mobil-
ity of aircraft); Note, supra note 102, at 135-36 (arguing that the ready access to local
deed records distinguishes them from the FAA records located in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma). A national filing statute like 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976) remedies the mobil-
ity and fragmentation problems. The Note author also reasoned that the analogy
failed because land title records are local, permitting ready access to the documents
on file. Id. This ignores the evidence produced in many cases that an interested per-
son can obtain a report by telephone disclosing whether any documents concerning a
particular aircraft have been received by the FAA and, if so, request a written report
of their contents for a nominal fee. The report is often received the next day. See
Bitzer-Croft Motors v. Pioneer Bank & Trust, 82 Ill. App. 3d 1, 401 N.E.2d 1340,
1343 (1980) (loan officer stating she had obtained by telephone call to a professional
title search firm in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma a report of filed documents affecting a
prospective aircraft and requested a written report of this); Dowell v. Beech Accept-
ance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 594, 476 P.2d 401, 402, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970) (noting that a title
check with the FAA cost $3.50), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971).
330 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
331 1964 REPORT, supra note 54, at 2320.
332 1964 REPORT, supra note 54, 2320.
333 Id. The 88th Congress enacted section 506, 49 U.S.C. § 1406, not as a comment
on section 503, 49 U.S.C. § 1403, but to designate controlling state law and the effect
of filing under state law. See supra notes 53-59. For an argument that some early
legislative history to a version of section 506 that was not enacted is merely legislative
comment on earlier legislation and without force of law, see Gary Aircraft Corp. v.
General Dynamics Corp. (In re Gary Aircraft Corp.), 681 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1982)
(stating that a different remark in some early legislative history of section 506, that
section 503 was merely a filing provision and not a priority provision, was confirma-
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which state's laws governed the determination of the validity
of a filed document. 34 By holding that a buyer has construc-
tive notice of a filed document's effect on title, a court recog-
nizes the effect Congress intended filed documents to have
under state law. The Senate did not determine the legal sig-
nificance of a buyer's constuctive notice, leaving this to state
law.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts have inconsistently resolved the impact of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958 on the doctrine of the buyer in the
ordinary course of business because they differ in interpreting
the language and congressional intent of the federal statute.
By its terms, the 1958 Act requires filing and recordation of
aircraft interests for those interests to be valid against third
parties.35 The Supreme Court's recent interpretation of sec-
tion 503(c) 33 6 in Philco Aviation, Inc. v. Shachet337 confirmed
this.33 8 However, section 503(e) establishes the only stated pri-
ority in the Act: liens in specific engines and propellers are
prior to liens in spare parts stocked at specific locations. 39 In-
terpreting the filing provisions of section 503 as creating a pri-
ority system for claimants to aircraft interests, therefore, does
not produce logical results because every filed interest would
be "valid" against every other filed interest.34 0 Such a result
does not indicate priority of any interest unless it is assumed
that a prior perfected interest has priority over subsequently
perfected interests, which is a major premise not stated in the
statute. 41 The statute, therefore, does not create a priority
system for determining the rights of claimants to interests in
tory but not conclusive regarding the Congressional intent behind section 503 because
the later Congress was not the Congress that enacted section 503), cert. denied, 1103
S. Ct. 3110 (1983).
334 See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
SU1 See supra notes 33-43, 47-52 and accompanying text.
3I6 See supra notes 45.
337 103 S. Ct. 2476 (1983).
8 Id. at 2479-80. See supra notes 37 and 269.
's' See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.




The legislative history of the 1958 Act indicates that Con-
gress did not intend to preempt state law which governs dis-
puted claims to chattels. 42 The incomplete priority scheme in
the federal statute implies Congress intended existing state
priority laws to govern controversies over interests in air-
craft. 3 The few courts that have found Congressional intent
to preempt state priority systems do not cite any legislative
history for authority but infer such intent from vague notions
of federal policy.34" The best view of the 1958 Act is that it
does not establish a priority system and does not preempt
state priority law.34 5 The 1958 Act establishes a national re-
cording system which preempts only state filing requirements.
Under state law, constuctive notice of a filed document's ef-
fect on title, i.e. its contents, affects a buyer in the ordinary
course of business if the security document prohibits sales by
the dealer without the inventory lender's prior approval. 3 6 A
buyer with constuctive notice that the sale to him violated an
inventory lender's right to approve or disapprove the sale is
outside the UCC definition of a buyer in the ordinary course
of business.3 47 Since Congress intended that all buyers be
deemed to know the effect on title of filed documents specify-
ing interests in aircraft, 348 even purchasers of new aircraft
would have to check the FAA registry to ascertain the dealer's
title and insist on the inventory lender's approval of the sale
before completing the transaction.
Constructive notice of a filed document's effect on title to
an aircraft would not affect a buyer in the ordinary course of
business if the inventory lender specifically permitted sales by
the dealer. A buyer with constructive notice that the sale to
3" See supra notes 53-91 and accompanying text.
343 See supra notes 241-91 and accompnaying text.
34' See, e.g., Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971), discussed supra notes 134-52 and
accompanying text; O'Neill v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville., N.A., 360 So. 2d 150
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), discussed supra notes i22-33 and accompanying text.
311 See supra notes 286-91.
", See supra notes 302-34.
347 U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1977), supra note 80.
318 1964 REPORT, supra note 54, at 2320.
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him may violate an inventory lender's rights under a filed se-
curity instrument does not know that the sale actually vio-
lates the lender's rights, because the buyer has not the duty,
capability, or right to ascertain whether the dealer has met all
the terms of the financing agreement. Therefore, lending
agreements filed with the FAA which permit sales unless the
dealer was in default would not give the buyer sufficient con-
structive knowledge that the sale to him violated the lender's
rights. A buyer with constructive notice that the dealer condi-
tionally had the right to sell the aircraft to him would still be
a buyer in the ordinary course of business under the UCC
definition.
Courts may find the lender's conduct indicates consent to
dealer sales, even absent express consent in the financing
agreement. A finding of implied consent would nullify any
constructive notice that the inventory lender had an express
right to withhold consent. A constructive notice theory based
on a security instrument filed with the FAA would not prevail
in courts that find the inventory lender consented to dealer
sales merely by financing inventory.
There does not appear to be a need for legislation to unify
the judicial determinations regarding the applicability of the
1958 Act because of the present trend in judicial interpreta-
tion. In states other than California849 and Florida,5 0 courts
determining the rights between a buyer in the ordinary course
and his seller's inventory lender rely on the UCC, not the 1958
Act to determine priorities. This majority position results
from federal and state courts determining that the 1958 Act
only preempts state filing requirements, not state priority sys-
tems. Courts which apply UCC article 9 to determine conflict-
ing claims in aircraft interests favor buyers in the ordinary
course of business over their sellers' inventory lenders. Fur-
ther decisions will probably continue to follow the UCC as
demonstrated by the latest and most well reasoned opinion,
' Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1970), cert denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971).
'"0 O'Neill v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, N.D., 360 So. 2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978).
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Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp. (In re Gary
Aircraft Corp.),351 which the Supreme Court recently and tac-
itly approved in Philco Aviation Inc. v. Shachet.
3 2
"I See supra notes 242-79 and accompanying text.
362 103 S. Ct. 2476, 2480 (1983), discussed supra notes 37 and 269.
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